Message-ID: <B3BCAF4246A8A84983A80DAB50FE724243F5DE@secnap2.secnap.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2005 13:08:07 -0400
From: "Michael Scheidell" <scheidell@...nap.net>
To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Cc: <security@...l.com>,
	<vulnwatch@...nwatch.org>,
	<cert@...t.org>,
	<security@...l.com>
Subject: Blank Administrator password in DELL XP Professional install


Vulnerability in DELL Windows XP Professional - default hidden Administrator account allows local Administrator access

Systems: DELL(tm) Laptops with Windows(tm); Professional 
Vulnerable: DELL Laptops with pre installed Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP2
Not Vulnerable: DELL Laptops with Retail Microsoft Windows XP professional, RTM, SP1 and SP2 
Severity: High
Category: Unauthorized Administrator Access
Classification: Default Authentication
BugTraq-ID: tbd 
CVE-Number: CAN-1999-0504
Remote Exploit: Maybe
Local Exploit: Yes
Vendor URL: www.dell.com
Author: Michael Scheidell, SECNAP Network Security
Internal Release date: May 31, 2005 
Notifications: May 31, 2005, Emailed various security and cert addresses at DELL
Vendor Response: June 7, 2005: Dell Emailed and requested more information
SECNAP response: June 7, 2005: Sent Dell serial number and service tag code on test system
Additional Contact: Emailed Dell on June 14, 2005 to request status
Additional Contact: Emailed Dell on June 21, 2005 to request status, cc'd original cert and security addresses
FBI Infragard Release: June 24, 2005
Public Release Date: June 27, 2005 

Problem: 

DELL OEM XP Processional has a default hidden administrator account.  Use of this account will allow anyone with physical access to the computer to fully control the computer, add spyware, keystroke loggers, password stealing software and read all files, including temp files, local files, documents, and any email that has been stored locally.

DELL does not inform the installer of this account, nor give them the option of putting a password on this account. If a savvy installer finds the function to change the password for the Administrator account, they are warned that they could lose data. Security best practices REQUIRE a password on all administrative (and root) accounts. 

See Dell web site on passwords:
Do's: Do's Use passwords with 6 or more characters
Do NOT's: Do not use passwords shorter then 6 characters[mss: I assume this means blank Administrator passwords also]
http://support.dell.com/support/topics/global.aspx/support/security/security_2?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs&~tab=3 
There is also a link to Microsoft's Web site on Dell's site 
http://www.microsoft.com/smallbusiness/issues/technology/security/5_tips_for_top_notch_password_security.mspx 

Because DELL marketing directly targets large publicly traded businesses, government agencies, and research organizations, these systems are used in regulated industries. Healthcare organizations must be HIPAA compliant; financial institutions must follow GLBA regulations; publicly traded firms are required to adhere to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; federally funded educational organizations are regulated by FERPA, and government agencies must comply with FISMA regulations. With such organizations comprising  a major portion of DELL's market share, it would be advantageous to ensure that products incorporated into DELL systems would help achieve compliance with such regulations.  

Note: this is similar to the problem found on IBM workstations in August, 2004 and fixed by IBM with SP2 release:

See: http://www.secnap.com/alerts.php?pg=5

This may not be the first report of this behavior. If others have reported on this issue before, please let us know: however, we searched the CVE database and only  found a distantly related problem dating back to 1999 where there is a warning against default, missing or weak administrator passwords.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CAN-1999-0504 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (<http://cve.mitre.org>), which standardizes names for security problems.

A retail setup implementation of Microsoft Windows XP Professional Edition, "Out-of-Box Experience" (OOBE), requires that the installer be given the option to add an Administrator account. During the installation, the XP Installer states : "You must provide a name and an Administrator password for your computer. Setup creates a user account called Administrator. You use this account when you need full access to your computer." While setup will not require that a password actually be entered, it does stress that one SHOULD be entered. Additionally, the user is prompted to create a regular user account for general use.

In contrast, the DELL setup implementation of Microsoft Windows XP Professional Edition does not include such steps. The existence of an administrator account is never mentioned. Instead, the setup asks: "Who will use this computer? Type the name of each person who will use this computer. Windows will create a separate user account for each person so you can personalize the way you want Windows to organize and display information, protect your files and computer settings, and customize the desktop. These names will appear on the Welcome screen in alphabetical order. When you start Windows, simply click your name on the Welcome screen to begin. If you want to set passwords and limit permissions for each user, or add more user accounts after you finish setting up Windows, just click CONTROL PANEL in the START menu, and then click USER ACCOUNTS." By default, none of the accounts added in this step have passwords. Nor is their an option to set passwords during the install. While this is not unique to the IBM install, it is a known weakness in the Windows XP OOBE, including retail and OEM versions. Because the Administrator account was never requested, this leaves the system in a very vulnerable state.

Local Exploit :
If Windows XP Professional is installed as part of a Windows Domain, the user selection menu is absent . If there is a user menu, hit <ctl><alt><del><ctl><alt><del> to pull the menu up

Type 'Administrator' in the Username Box.
Leave the Password Box Empty.
If there is a domain in the Domain Box, change it to the local computer
Hit Enter
You now have full control over this system and can install keystroke loggers, capture passwords, install network sniffers, browse (and change) cookies of the users, read and copy any local documents or files

Remote Exploit:
Remote exploit is not possible unless someone changed the security feature that disabled network access for accounts with blank passwords
If remote access is possible, use MACHINENAME/Administrator as the user authentication when connecting to the $SYSTEM or $C share.
If you gain access, you can remotely load, install, read, take over the computer.

Work Around
By using the Computer Management application and looking under 'System Tools->Local Users and Groups->Users', we see that the Administrator account has been added and enabled. This account IS NOT password-protected. If the installer sets a password for EVERY user shown under the User Accounts tool in the Control Panel, THE DEFAULT ADMINISTRATOR ACCOUNT STILL EXISTS WITH NO PASSWORD.

The Installation Setup never informed the user that the account existed. If a user attempts to manually set a password for the Administrator account, they are greeted with the following warning: "Password for Administrator: Resetting this password might cause irreversible loss of information for this user account. For security reasons, Windows protects certain information by making it impossible to access if the user's password is reset. This data loss will occur the next time the user logs off. You should use this command only if a user has forgotten his or her password and does not have a password reset disk. If this user has created a password reset disk, then he or she should use that disk to set the password. If the user knows the password and wants to change it, he or she should log in, then press CTRL+ALT+DELETE and click Change Password. For additional information, click Help. [Proceed] [Cancel] [Help]." This warning exists in all versions of Windows XP, but it is not presented from the Control Panel Users Accounts tool. If a password is changed from the Control Panel's User Accounts section, no such warning is issue; but, again, the Administrator account is hidden from User Accounts.

In summary, Due to the lack of an Administrative Setup screen for the DELL Windows XP OOBE flow, it is more difficult for a security-conscious organization to manage a Windows XP-based DELL environment. In order to protect a system, several unintuitive additional steps must be taken on each systems in the environment, despite warnings against taking such steps.

SECNAP has tested this situation against DELL Windows XP Pro SP2. SECNAP also recommends that DELL notify all existing registered clients using the vulnerable systems to upgrade, possibly to a DELL-released patch, or modified version of SP2, that would additionally address the issues. 

Vendor Response
On Jun 7th, 2005, Vendor requested and received serial number, service tag and OOBEINFO.INI from the test computer
We attempted to contact them again on June 14th, and June 21st. No response

Credit:
Original alert on IBM Workstation by Jason Lash, SECNAP Network Security, www.secnap.com, research on DELL Laptops by Michael Scheidell, SECNAP Network Security.
An original copy of this alert can be found here release: http://www.secnap.com/alerts.php?pg=8

Copyright: 
Above Copyright© 2005, SECNAP Network Security Corporation. World rights reserved. 

This security report can be copied and redistributed electronically provided it is not edited and is quoted in its entirety without written consent of SECNAP Network Security Corporation. Additional information or permission may be obtained by contacting SECNAP Network Security at 561-999-5000

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