bugtraq - /dev/random is probably not

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Message-ID: <200507011710.35815.mycroft@netbsd.org>
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2005 17:10:35 +0000
From: "Charles M. Hannum" <mycroft@...bsd.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: /dev/random is probably not

Most implementations of /dev/random (or so-called "entropy gathering daemons") 
rely on disk I/O timings as a primary source of randomness.  This is based on 
a CRYPTO '94 paper[1] that analyzed randomness from air turbulence inside the 
drive case.

I was recently introduced to Don Davis and, being the sort of person who 
rethinks everything, I began to question the correctness of this methodology.  
While I have found no fault with the original analysis (and have not actually 
considered it much), I have found three major problems with the way it is 
implemented in current systems.  I have not written exploits for these 
problems, but I believe it is readily apparent that such exploits could be 
written.

a) Most modern IDE drives, at least, ship with write-behind caching enabled.  
This means that a typical write returns a successful status after the data is 
written into the drive's buffer, before the drive even begins the process of 
writing the data to the medium.  Therefore, if we do not overflow the buffer 
and get stuck waiting for previous data to be flushed, the timing will not 
include any air turbulence whatsoever, and should have nearly constant time.

b) At least one implementation uses *all* "disk" type devices -- including 
flash devices, which we expect to have nearly constant time -- for timing.  
This is obviously a bogus source of entropy.

c) Even if we turned off write-behind caching, and so our timings did include 
air turbulence, consider how a typical application is written.  It waits for, 
say, a read() to complete and then immediately does something else.  By 
timing how long this higher-level operation (read(), or possibly even a 
remote request via HTTP, SMTP, etc.) takes, we can apply an adjustment factor 
and determine with a reasonable probability how long the actual disk I/O 
took.

Using any of these strategies, it is possible for us to know the input data to 
the RNG -- either by measurement or by stuffing -- and, therefore, quite 
possibly determine the future output of the RNG.

Have a nice holiday weekend.

[1] D. Davis, R. Ihaka, P.R. Fenstermacher, "Cryptographic Randomness from Air 
Turbulence in Disk Drives", in  Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '94 
Conference Proceedings, edited by Yvo G. Desmedt, pp.114--120. Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science #839. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1994.