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Message-ID: <ldvd5pnaolt.fsf@cathode-dark-space.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2005 14:03:26 -0400
From: Tom Yu <tlyu@....EDU>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: MITKRB5-SA-2005-003: double-free in krb5_recvauth
MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2005-003
Original release: 2005-07-12
Topic: double-free in krb5_recvauth
Severity: CRITICAL
SUMMARY
=======
The krb5_recvauth() function can free previously freed memory under
some error conditions. This vulnerability may allow an
unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code.
Exploitation of this vulnerability on a Kerberos Key Distribution
Center (KDC) host can result in compromise of an entire Kerberos
realm. No exploit code is known to exist at this time. Exploitation
of double-free vulnerabilities is believed to be difficult.
[CAN-2005-1689, VU#623332]
IMPACT
======
An unauthenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code in
the context of a program calling krb5_recvauth(). This includes the
kpropd program which typically runs on slave Key Distribution Center
(KDC) hosts, potentially leading to compromise of an entire Kerberos
realm. Other vulnerable programs which call krb5_recvauth() are
usually remote login programs running with root privileges.
Unsuccessful attempts at exploitation may result in denial of service
by crashing the target program.
AFFECTED SOFTWARE
=================
* The kpropd daemon in all releases of MIT krb5, up to and including
krb5-1.4.1, is vulnerable.
* The klogind and krshd remote-login daemons in all releases of MIT
krb5, up to and including krb5-1.4.1, is vulnerable.
* Third-party application programs which call krb5-recvauth() are also
vulnerable.
FIXES
=====
* The upcoming krb5-1.4.2 release will have a fix for this
vulnerability.
* Apply the following patch. This patch was generated against the
krb5-1.4.1 release. It may apply, with some offset, to earlier
releases.
The patch may also be found at:
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2005-003-patch_1.4.1.txt
The associated detached PGP signature is at:
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2005-003-patch_1.4.1.txt.asc
Index: lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c,v
retrieving revision 5.38
diff -c -r5.38 recvauth.c
*** lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c 3 Sep 2002 01:13:47 -0000 5.38
--- lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c 23 May 2005 23:19:15 -0000
***************
*** 76,82 ****
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
if (strcmp(inbuf.data, sendauth_version)) {
- krb5_xfree(inbuf.data);
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS;
}
krb5_xfree(inbuf.data);
--- 76,81 ----
***************
*** 90,96 ****
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
if (appl_version && strcmp(inbuf.data, appl_version)) {
- krb5_xfree(inbuf.data);
if (!problem)
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS;
}
--- 89,94 ----
REFERENCES
==========
This announcement and related security advisories may be found on the
MIT Kerberos security advisory page at:
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/index.html
The main MIT Kerberos web page is at:
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/index.html
CVE: CAN-2005-1689
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1689
CERT: VU#623332
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/623332
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
===============
Thanks to Magnus Hagander for reporting this vulnerability.
DETAILS
=======
The helper function revcauth_common() in lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c has
two locations which call krb5_read_message(), followed by an
unconditional krb5_xfree() of the buffer allocated by
krb5_read_message(). In the cases where the sendauth version string
or the application version string do not match the expected value,
recvauth_common() performs a krb5_xfree() on the buffer allocated by
krb5_read_message() preceding the subsequent unconditional call to
krb5_xfree() on the same buffer.
Since the code paths which call krb5_xfree() twice do so with almost
no intervening code, exploitation of this vulnerability may be more
difficult than exploitation of other double-free vulnerabilities. No
detailed analysis has been performed on the ease of exploitation.
REVISION HISTORY
================
2005-05-12 original release
Copyright (C) 2005 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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