Message-ID: <E1DyMnm-0007tT-Ah@mercury.mandriva.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2005 22:48:54 -0600
From: Mandriva Security Team <security@...driva.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: MDKSA-2005:127 - Updated mozilla-thunderbird packages fix multiple vulnerabilities


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 _______________________________________________________________________

                Mandriva Linux Security Update Advisory
 _______________________________________________________________________

 Package name:           mozilla-thunderbird
 Advisory ID:            MDKSA-2005:127
 Date:                   July 28th, 2005

 Affected versions:	 10.2
 ______________________________________________________________________

 Problem Description:

 A number of vulnerabilities were reported and fixed in Thunderbird 1.0.5
 and Mozilla 1.7.9.  The following vulnerabilities have been backported
 and patched for this update:
 
 The native implementations of InstallTrigger and other XPInstall-
 related javascript objects did not properly validate that they were
 called on instances of the correct type.  By passing other objects,
 even raw numbers, the javascript interpreter would jump to the wrong
 place in memory.  Although no proof of concept has been developed we
 believe this could be exploited (MFSA 2005-40).
 
 moz_bug_r_a4 reported several exploits giving an attacker the ability
 to install malicious code or steal data, requiring only that the user
 do commonplace actions like clicking on a link or open the context
 menu.  The common cause in each case was privileged UI code ("chrome")
 being overly trusting of DOM nodes from the content window.  Scripts in
 the web page can override properties and methods of DOM nodes and
 shadow the native values, unless steps are taken to get the true
 underlying values (MFSA 2005-41).
 
 Additional checks were added to make sure Javascript eval and Script
 objects are run with the privileges of the context that created them,
 not the potentially elevated privilege of the context calling them in
 order to protect against an additional variant of MFSA 2005-41
 (MFSA 2005-44).
 
 In several places the browser UI did not correctly distinguish between
 true user events, such as mouse clicks or keystrokes, and synthetic
 events genenerated by web content. The problems ranged from minor
 annoyances like switching tabs or entering full-screen mode, to a   
 variant on MFSA 2005-34 Synthetic events are now prevented from
 reaching the browser UI entirely rather than depend on each potentially
 spoofed function to protect itself from untrusted events
 (MFSA 2005-45).
 
 Scripts in XBL controls from web content continued to be run even when
 Javascript was disabled. By itself this causes no harm, but it could be
 combined with most script-based exploits to attack people running
 vulnerable versions who thought disabling javascript would protect
 them.  In the Thunderbird and Mozilla Suite mail clients Javascript is
 disabled by default for protection against denial-of-service attacks
 and worms; this vulnerability could be used to bypass that protection
 (MFSA 2005-46).
 
 When InstallVersion.compareTo() is passed an object rather than a
 string it assumed the object was another InstallVersion without
 verifying it. When passed a different kind of object the browser would
 generally crash with an access violation.  shutdown has demonstrated
 that different javascript objects can be passed on some OS versions to
 get control over the instruction pointer. We assume this could be
 developed further to run arbitrary machine code if the attacker can get
 exploit code loaded at a predictable address (MFSA 2005-50).
 
 A child frame can call top.focus() even if the framing page comes from
 a different origin and has overridden the focus() routine. The call is
 made in the context of the child frame. The attacker would look for a
 target site with a framed page that makes this call but doesn't verify
 that its parent comes from the same site. The attacker could steal
 cookies and passwords from the framed page, or take actions on behalf
 of a signed-in user. This attack would work only against sites that use
 frames in this manner (MFSA 2005-52).
 
 Parts of the browser UI relied too much on DOM node names without
 taking different namespaces into account and verifying that nodes
 really were of the expected type. An XHTML document could be used to
 create fake <IMG> elements, for example, with content-defined
 properties that the browser would access as if they were the trusted
 built-in properties of the expected HTML elements.  The severity of the
 vulnerability would depend on what the attacker could convince the
 victim to do, but could result in executing user-supplied script with
 elevated "chrome" privileges. This could be used to install malicious
 software on the victim's machine (MFSA 2005-55).
 
 Improper cloning of base objects allowed web content scripts to walk up
 the prototype chain to get to a privileged object.  This could be used
 to execute code with enhanced privileges (MFSA 2005-56).
 
 The updated packages have been patched to address these issue.
 _______________________________________________________________________

 References:

  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2260
  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2261
  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2265
  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2266
  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2269
  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2270
  http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-40.html
  http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-41.html
  http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-44.html
  http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-45.html
  http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-46.html
  http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-50.html
  http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-52.html
  http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-55.html
  http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-56.html
  http://secunia.com/advisories/15549/
 ______________________________________________________________________

 Updated Packages:
  
 Mandrakelinux 10.2:
 c5513d4936daccacf32a269955aab5e3  10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-1.0.2-2.1.102mdk.i586.rpm
 47c31106dcd41d9ebc7cf75db8c7cd8b  10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-devel-1.0.2-2.1.102mdk.i586.rpm
 348c4fef5cd18162ef7012176db573ee  10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-enigmail-1.0.2-2.1.102mdk.i586.rpm
 ba650af5452d16435b872b1bdb8e7c13  10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-enigmime-1.0.2-2.1.102mdk.i586.rpm
 893d9c6ed194b8ec828aada5511e0404  10.2/SRPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-1.0.2-2.1.102mdk.src.rpm

 Mandrakelinux 10.2/X86_64:
 c2a98ab44b911f192d5d16ba3db2817e  x86_64/10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-1.0.2-2.1.102mdk.x86_64.rpm
 621eb09e3cbaa82dea7a4f1ce7e7381a  x86_64/10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-devel-1.0.2-2.1.102mdk.x86_64.rpm
 f206ad704f5167a45eeeb6f0bc0956e2  x86_64/10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-enigmail-1.0.2-2.1.102mdk.x86_64.rpm
 ac1b7057ecb344292f9264131ecaa93c  x86_64/10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-enigmime-1.0.2-2.1.102mdk.x86_64.rpm
 893d9c6ed194b8ec828aada5511e0404  x86_64/10.2/SRPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-1.0.2-2.1.102mdk.src.rpm
 _______________________________________________________________________

 To upgrade automatically use MandrakeUpdate or urpmi.  The verification
 of md5 checksums and GPG signatures is performed automatically for you.

 All packages are signed by Mandriva for security.  You can obtain the
 GPG public key of the Mandriva Security Team by executing:

  gpg --recv-keys --keyserver pgp.mit.edu 0x22458A98

 You can view other update advisories for Mandriva Linux at:

  http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories

 If you want to report vulnerabilities, please contact

  security_(at)_mandriva.com
 _______________________________________________________________________

 Type Bits/KeyID     Date       User ID
 pub  1024D/22458A98 2000-07-10 Mandriva Security Team
  <security*mandriva.com>

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