| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Sun, 24 Jul 2005 05:31:21 +0100 From: Duncan Simpson <dps@...pson.demon.co.uk> To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: Re: On classifying attacks Nobody has brought this up, so perhaps I should. The problem most clasiffication schemes discussed are hitting is that security holes are transitive: remote arbitary code execution+local root exploit=remote root exploit. If the exploit code is running on your box then any exploits it peforms are probably local, even if the attack code is launched by a remote exploit. A description of a beast as composition of seperate remote and local exploits would allow a simple remote/local distinction to apply (where "local" means requiring the code to executed on the attacked box). Whether trojans count as exploits per se or not is harder--most trojans and other malware involve authorised users explicitly running a program and that program doing authorised things. The activity being undesirable activity the victim did not intend does not change that fact. As far "malicious data that the victim must explicitly execute" I think such a word already exists: malware (or trojan, if the appropriate disguise applies). The success rate of persuading users to run such code is distressingly high. -- Duncan (-: "software industry, the: unique industry where selling substandard goods is legal and you can charge extra for fixing the problems."
Powered by blists - more mailing lists