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Message-ID: <78FA4E96C9E69341989E9416E06225DB7A17B1@tgbex.otl.portcullis-security.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2005 16:04:40 +0100
From: "Paul J Docherty" <PJD@...tcullis-security.com>
To: "bugs" <bugs@...uritytracker.com>,
	"Bugtraq" <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>, "secunia" <vuln@...unia.com>
Subject: Portcullis Security Advisory 05-014 HP Openview Remote Command
    Execution Vulnerability


Portcullis Security Advisory 05-014 HP Openview Remote Command Execution
Vulnerability

Vulnerable System: 
HP OpenView Network Node Manager 6.41 and 7.5 running on Solaris 8
(confirmed) HP OpenView Network Node Manager all version all operating
systems (unconfirmed) 

Vulnerability Title: 
Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution In HP OpenView Network Node
Manager

Vulnerability discovery and development: 
James Fisher of Portcullis Computer Security Ltd discovered this
vulnerability during an network security assessment.  Due to inadequate
input validation by the Network Node Manager application, it was
possible to execute system level commands within the privilege context
of the web server user.

Affected systems: 
It has been confirmed that versions 6.41 and 7.5 are vulnerable on Sun
Solaris 8 (Sparc), however it is highly likely that all versions of the
software on all supported operating systems are likely to be vulnerable,
however this has not been confirmed.

Details: 
It was identified that connectedNodes.ovpl script will take input from a
user and concatenate that input with an existing string.  This resultant
string is then executed as a system command by the web server, without
validating the data sent from the user.  Thus it is possible for an
attacker to inject their own system commands.

Impact: 
An attacker can blindly execute system commands (as no command output is
returned) with the privileges of the web server, by using a pipe command
separator to initiate a new command.   However, the connectedNodes.ovpl
script will error if either of the "<" or ">" characters are included,
thus making commands which redirect input/output fail. Despite this
limitation it was possible to script the binding of a shell to a port as
proved by Paul Docherty (Portcullis Computer Security Ltd) thus
providing a fully interactive remote shell running with the privileges
of the "bin" user account.

Exploit: 
Entering the following URL
"http://[host]:3443/OvCgi/connectedNodes.ovpl?node=a| [your command] |"
to a web browser will exploit the vulnerability.
(Note the square brackets should be removed)
 
Copyright: 
Copyright (c) Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2005. All rights
reserved worldwide.


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