bugtraq - Astaro Security Linux 6.0 - HTTP CONNECT Access Localhost Weakness

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Message-ID: <1124956543.7076.58.camel@bitch.rwc.sym.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2005 09:55:45 +0200
From: oliver karow <oliver.karow@....de>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Astaro Security Linux 6.0 - HTTP CONNECT Access Localhost Weakness

Astaro Security Linux 6.0 - HTTP CONNECT Access Localhost Weakness
==================================================================

Product:
========

Astaro Security Linux 6.0 is a network security solution, including a
combination of the following security applications:

- Stateful inspection firewall with application proxies
- VPN
- AV
- IDS
- AntiSpam
- ContentFilter

Vuln 
====

A proxy is running on Port 8080/TCP, accepting HTTP CONNECT requests
destinated to localhost. Therefore it is f.e. possible to connect to
the installed HTTPd, running on localhost. Other scenarios like
connecting to the SSH-Admin port are possible, depending on the
configuration of the allowed destination ports for the CONNECT method.

Exploiting
==========

No exploit required. Simply netcat to the proxy port and enter the
following command:

CONNECT localhost:80 HTTP/1.0

MISC
====

In addition i found some other, interesting issues, which can be
security relevant, depending on the usage of the product:

1) Sending an invalid, unauthenticated request ("CONNECT localhost 21
HTTP/1.0") to the proxy port delivers the following information:

"Proxy-authorization: Basic LTpwcHBwCg=="

as part of the proxy response.

The string can also be found hardcodet in the binary
"/var/storage/chroot-http/usr/bin/hyperdyper". 

This login-credentials are used internaly by the Content Filter
Framework. 

2) Astaro can be configured using Webmin. Due to a directory traversal
vuln. is it possible for authenticated webmin users to access files on
the filesystem, which are not accessible via the webmin-gui, and should
only be accessable by console-users:

GET
/index.fpl?SID=1497553306006&id=0555&frameset=active&wfe_download=/../../etc/passwd&fname=MeinePasswd&mime_type=application%2foctet%2dstream HTTP/1.1

3) If an administrator is logged in via webmin, and another
administrator is logging in, the new admin can disconnect/kick the
currently logged in one. Thereby it is possible to supply a message,
that will be automaticly displayed at the kicked admins browser.
However, supplying Script-Code instead of a message leads to an
automated execution of the code in the kicked admins browser.

So, not realy risky but shows missing input filtering.

Its up to the reader to deside about the risk level of 1-3. I just sent
this information for completeness. 

Version
========

The vulnerable version of the product is 6.0.0.1

Solution
========

Upgrade to version 6.0.0.2
Upgrade is available at the vendors website.

Vendor
======

http://www.astaro.com

Astaro respondet very fast, and was very cooperative. 
Fixes were delivered within a day after informing.

Discovered
==========

oliver karow
10.08.2005
http://www.oliverkarow.de/research/astaro.txt