Message-ID: <20051112001534.87155.qmail@smasher.org>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2005 19:15:25 -0500 (EST)
From: Atom Smasher <atom@...sher.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: GAO report on e-voting


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Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting 
Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed

...

the complete report is available here - 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf

included below is the "Results in Brief" section.

...

Results in Brief

While electronic voting systems hold promise for a more accurate and 
efficient election process, numerous entities have raised concerns about 
their security and reliability, citing instances of weak security 
controls, system design flaws, inadequate system version control, 
inadequate security testing, incorrect system configuration, poor security 
management, and vague or incomplete voting system standards, among other 
issues. For example, studies found (1) some electronic voting systems did 
not encrypt cast ballots or system audit logs, and it was possible to 
alter both without being detected; (2) it was possible to alter the files 
that define how a ballot looks and works so that the votes for one 
candidate could be recorded for a different candidate; and (3) vendors 
installed uncertified versions of voting system software at the local 
level. It is important to note that many of the reported concerns were 
drawn from specific system makes and models or from a specific 
jurisdiction's election, and that there is a lack of consensus among 
election officials and other experts on the pervasiveness of the concerns. 
Nevertheless, some of these concerns were reported to have caused local 
problems in federal elections--resulting in the loss or miscount of 
votes--and therefore merit attention.

Federal organizations and nongovernmental groups have issued recommended 
practices and guidance for improving the election process, including 
electronic voting systems, as well as general practices for the security 
and reliability of information systems. For example, in mid-2004, EAC 
issued a compendium of practices recommended by election experts, 
including state and local election officials. This compendium includes 
approaches for making voting processes more secure and reliable through, 
for example, risk analysis of the voting process, poll worker security 
training, and chain of custody controls for election day operations, along 
with practices that are specific to ensuring the security and reliability 
of different types of electronic voting systems. As another example, in 
July 2004, the California Institute of Technology and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology issued a report containing recommendations 
pertaining to testing equipment, retaining audit logs, and physically 
securing voting systems. In addition to such election-specific practices, 
numerous recommended practices are available that can be applied to any 
information system. For instance, we, NIST, and others have issued 
guidance that emphasizes the importance of incorporating security and 
reliability into the life cycle of information systems through practices 
related to security planning and management, risk management, and 
procurement. The recommended practices in these election-specific and 
information technology (IT) focused documents provide valuable guidance 
that, if implemented effectively, should help improve the security and 
reliability of voting systems.

Since the passage of HAVA in 2002, the federal government has begun a 
range of actions that are expected to improve the security and reliability 
of electronic voting systems. Specifically, after beginning operations in 
January 2004, EAC has led efforts to (1) draft changes to the existing 
federal voluntary standards for voting systems, including provisions 
related to security and reliability, (2) develop a process for certifying, 
decertifying, and recertifying voting systems, (3) establish a program to 
accredit the national independent testing laboratories that test 
electronic voting systems against the federal voluntary standards, and (4) 
develop a software library and clearinghouse for information on state and 
local elections and systems. However, these actions are unlikely to have a 
significant effect in the 2006 federal election cycle because the changes 
to the voluntary standards have not yet been completed, the system 
certification and laboratory accreditation programs are still in 
development, and the software library has not been updated or improved 
since the 2004 elections. Further, EAC has not defined tasks, processes, 
and time frames for completing these activities. As a result, it is 
unclear when the results will be available to assist state and local 
election officials. In addition to the federal government's activities, 
other organizations have actions under way that are intended to improve 
the security and reliability of electronic voting systems. These actions 
include developing and obtaining international acceptance for voting 
system standards, developing voting system software in an open source 
environment (i.e., not proprietary to any particular company), and 
cataloging and analyzing reported problems with electronic voting systems.

To improve the security and reliability of electronic voting systems, we 
are recommending that EAC establish tasks, processes, and time frames for 
improving the federal voluntary voting system standards, testing 
capabilities, and management support available to state and local election 
officials.

EAC and NIST provided written comments on a draft of this report (see 
apps. V and VI). EAC commissioners agreed with our recommendations and 
stated that actions on each are either under way or intended. NIST's 
director agreed with the report's conclusions. In addition to their 
comments on our recommendations, EAC commissioners expressed three 
concerns with our use of reports produced by others to identify issues 
with the security and reliability of electronic voting systems. 
Specifically, EAC sought (1) additional clarification on our sources, (2) 
context on the extent to which voting system problems are systemic, and 
(3) substantiation of claims in the reports issued by others. To address 
these concerns, we provided additional clarification of sources where 
applicable. Further, we note throughout our report that many issues 
involved specific system makes and models or circumstances in the 
elections of specific jurisdictions. We also note that there is a lack of 
consensus on the pervasiveness of the problems, due in part to a lack of 
comprehensive information on what system makes and models are used in 
jurisdictions throughout the country. Additionally, while our work focused 
on identifying and grouping problems and vulnerabilities identified in 
issued reports and studies, where appropriate and feasible, we sought 
additional context, clarification, and corroboration from experts, 
including election officials, security experts, and key reports' authors. 
EAC commissioners also expressed concern that we focus too much on the 
commission, and noted that it is one of many entities with a role in 
improving the security and reliability of voting systems. While we agree 
that EAC is one of many entities with responsibilities for improving the 
security and reliability of voting systems, we believe that our focus on 
EAC is appropriate, given its leadership role in defining voting system 
standards, in establishing programs both to accredit laboratories and to 
certify voting systems, and in acting as a clearinghouse for improvement 
efforts across the nation. EAC and NIST officials also provided detailed 
technical corrections, which we incorporated throughout the report as 
appropriate.

###


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