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Message-ID: <43A00C20.9060409@gentoo.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 13:12:16 +0100
From: Thierry Carrez <koon@...too.org>
To: yvan.vanhullebus@...asq.com, paul@...erance.com
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: [ GLSA 200512-04 ] Openswan,
IPsec-Tools: Vulnerabilities in ISAKMP Protocol implementation
VANHULLEBUS Yvan wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 13, 2005 at 09:49:40PM +0100, Paul Wouters wrote:
>
>>On Mon, 12 Dec 2005, Thierry Carrez wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>>>Impact
>>>======
>>>
>>>A remote attacker can create a specially crafted packet using 3DES with
>>>an invalid key length, resulting in a Denial of Service attack, format
>>>string vulnerabilities or buffer overflows.
>>
>>That's a copy and paste from the IPsec proto testsuite.
>>
>>1) It conflicts with the above comment that this is only a DOS
>>2) It's incorrect (for openswan)
>
> Also incorrect for ipsec-tools AFAIK. The only problem we noticed with
> protos testsuite was a lack of verification for some payloads
> existency in aggressive mode.
>
>>>Workaround
>>>==========
>>>
>>>Avoid using "aggressive mode" in ISAKMP Phase 1, which exchanges
>>>information between the sides before there is a secure channel.
>>
>>In fact, you would to both have aggressive mode enabled AND know the PSK.
>>If you have those two enabled, you are vulnerable to a MITM anyway, since
>>any client knowing the PSK can pretend to be the IPsec security gateway.
>
>
> Knowing the PSK is not really needed, as AGGRESSIVE+PSK mode is known
> to be quite unsecure, and can be bruteforced offline.
>
> The "workaround" for ipsec-tools is to upgrade, and is only needed for
> some people which really have a week configuration and should care
> about lots of potential problems !
Paul, Yvan,
Many thanks for the precisions and sorry for getting it wrong. I'll fix
the GLSA text for Impact and Workaround on the Gentoo website asap.
--
Thierry Carrez (Koon)
Gentoo Linux Security
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