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Message-ID: <43C2D4FB.5000604@idefense.com>
Date: Mon, 09 Jan 2006 16:26:19 -0500
From: "labs-no-reply@...fense.com" <labs-no-reply@...fense.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, vulnwatch@...nwatch.org,
	full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 01.09.06: Multiple Vendor mod_auth_pgsql
 Format String Vulnerability


Multiple Vendor mod_auth_pgsql Format String Vulnerability

iDefense Security Advisory 01.09.06
http://www.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=367
January 09, 2006

I. BACKGROUND

The mod_auth_pgsql apache module allows user authentication against
information stored in a PostgreSQL database. More information can be
found at the following site:

    http://www.giuseppetanzilli.it/mod_auth_pgsql2/

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of a format string vulnerability in multiple
versions of the mod_auth_pgsql authentication module for the Apache
httpd could allow the execution of arbitrary code in the context of the
httpd.

The mod_auth_pgsql module for the Apache httpd is a third party
authentication module which allows authentication details to be stored
in a PostgreSQL database. Although this is a third party module, it is
available as a package for several distributions, including Red Hat
Linux, Debian GNU/Linux and FreeBSD.

Due to a design error, many of the logging functions in this module take
user supplied values as input to the format specifier. An example of
this is shown below:

    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, pg_errstr);

When part of the error message contains a format string specifier it is
processed. For example, for the username "%x%x%x%x%x", output  similar
to the following may appear in the 'error_log' file for the  targetted
httpd:

[Tue Sep 23 11:34:38 2005] [error] [client 10.1.10.11] mod_auth_pgsql:
 Password for user 406869a083b3c900083b3cb3 not found (PG-Authoritative)

The sequence of hex characters is the result of the ap_log_rerror()
function parsing the input string as a format string, and contains
values from the stack. When the name supplied causes an invalid memory
access, the child process may exit with a logged error similar to:

[Tue Sep 24 11:25:53 2005] [notice] child pid 12345 exit signal
 Segmentation fault (11)

III. ANALYSIS

Successful exploitation allows remote attackers to gain local access to
the vulnerable system in the context of the affected httpd. In order to
exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must know the URI of at least
one reource on the web server which is configured to use this module for
authentication. This module is not installed by default, but is
available as a package from some vendors, including Red Hat. Additional
configuration is required before the module is active after installing.

While format string exploit techniques are well documented, most
discussions of and exploits for vulnerabilities containing them rely on
the user supplied string being located on the stack. The reason for
this is that it allows the attacker to directly supply pointers to the
memory locations they wish to modify via the %n format specifier. As
this module does not store the format string on the stack, this may make
exploitation more difficult as techniques for exploiting this kind of
format string are not as commonly known. However, such information is
publicly available.

Successful exploitation would allow a remote unauthenticated user access
to an affected system with the permissions of the httpd itself.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in version
2.0.2b1 of mod_auth_pgsql for Apache 2.x. It is suspected that earlier
versions are also affected.

V. WORKAROUND

Disable the module, and use another form of authentication for the
affected resource.

In order to disable the module on Red Hat systems, execute the following
commands as root:

  cd /etc/httpd/conf.d
  mv auth_pgsql.conf auth_pgsql.disabled

If you have any '.htaccess' files, you may also have to disable any
authentication with references to mod_auth_pgsql directives. These
directives all start with 'Auth_PG_'.

At this point, you should add another authentication method for the
resources that were protected by this module. The exact operations to
perform are dependant on which authentication method you choose to use.

After performing these steps, restart the httpd by executing the
following command as root:

  /sbin/service httpd restart

For other distributions, the general steps are the same (disable the
module, add another form of authentication, and restart the httpd),
however the details may vary slightly.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

The maintainer has released mod_auth_pgsql 2.0.3 to address this
vulnerability, which is available for download at:

  http://www.giuseppetanzilli.it/mod_auth_pgsql2/dist/
 
Red Hat, Inc:

Updates are available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 and 4 to correct
this issue.  Red Hat Enterprise Linux 2.1 was not affected by this
issue. New mod_auth_pgsql packages along with our advisory are available
at the URL below and by using the Red Hat Network 'up2date' tool.
 
 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2006-0164.html

Updates are available for Fedora Core 3 and 4 to correct this issue.
 
 www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-announce-list/2006-January/msg00016.html
 www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-announce-list/2006-January/msg00015.html

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2005-3656 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

11/15/2005  Initial vendor notification
11/22/2005  Initial vendor response
01/09/2006  Coordinated public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

The discovery of this vulnerability is credited to Sparfell.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://www.idefense.com/poi/teams/vcp.jsp

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http://labs.idefense.com

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2006 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please
email customerservice@...fense.com for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
this information.


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