bugtraq - Statement Regarding Reported Local Escalation of Privileges Vulnerability for ZoneAlarm

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Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2006 15:47:27 -0800
From: "Zone Labs Product Security" <Product-Security.at.zonelabs.com@...hael.checkpoint.com>
To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Statement Regarding Reported Local Escalation of Privileges Vulnerability for ZoneAlarm

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Statement Regarding Reported Local Escalation of Privileges Vulnerability for ZoneAlarm

Severity: 
Low

Impact: 
Local escalation of privileges

Remotely exploitable:
No

Affected software: 
ZoneAlarm and its variations (6.x confirmed, other versions may be susceptible)
Integrity (specific versions affected not yet determined)

Description:
A local escalation of privileges issue in ZoneAlarm products does exist.

The TrueVector service (VSMON.exe), which runs under the local SYSTEM account, 
loads several DLLs (Dynamically Linked Libraries) as part of its startup process - which by default happens 
automatically when a user starts Windows. 
In some cases, DLLs may not be present in a given installation but will be searched for anyway. 
If a DLL matching one of those names appears in the set of directories searched, 
it may be loaded with the same privileges as the TrueVector service (SYSTEM level account). 
Internal testing of the issue is still ongoing, and additional symptoms may be undiscovered at this stage.

How an attacker may exploit this:
An attacker who succeeds placing a malicious DLL in a folder, which appears in the PATH before the ZoneAlarm folder, 
might run the malicious DLL under the SYSTEM local account privileges. 
Any software program that runs with SYSTEM privileges and dynamically loads DLLs from the PATH 
could be subjected to a similar issue. 

Mitigating factors:
An attacker must first place, or convince the user to place, a malicious DLL in a folder 
that appears in the path before the ZoneAlarm folder. 
In order to accomplish this, the machine would already be compromised through another hacking method, 
either Trojan-like malware or through social engineering.

Patch Release:
This issue has been given a high priority and a fix is currently under development. 
As soon as it is finished and tested, it will be released through a special product update. 

We encourage security researchers and users to report security related issues to security@...elabs.com.
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