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Message-ID: <442B6B1A.4060300@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2006 23:22:34 -0600
From: "Gerald (Jerry) Carter" <jerry@...ba.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Cc: security@...ba.org
Subject: [SECURITY] Samba 3.0.21-3.0.21c: Exposure of machine account credentials
in winbindd log files
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==========================================================
==
== Subject: Exposed clear text of domain machine
== account password in debug logs (log
== level >= 5)
== CVE ID#: CAN_2006-1059
==
== Versions: Samba Samba 3.0.21 - 3.0.21c (inclusive)
==
== Summary: The winbindd daemon writes the clear text
== of the machine trust account password to
== log files. These log files are world
== readable by default.
==
==========================================================
===========
Description
===========
The machine trust account password is the secret shared
between a domain controller and a specific member server.
Access to the member server machine credentials allows
an attacker to impersonate the server in the domain and
gain access to additional information regarding domain
users and groups.
The winbindd daemon included in Samba 3.0.21 and subsequent
patch releases (3.0.21a-c) writes the clear text of server's
machine credentials to its log file at level 5. The winbindd
log files are world readable by default and often log files
are requested on open mailing lists as tools used to debug
server misconfigurations.
This affects servers configured to use domain or ads security
and possibly Samba domain controllers as well (if configured
to use winbindd).
==================
Patch Availability
==================
Samba 3.0.22 has been released to address this one security
defect. A patch for Samba 3.0.21[a-c] has been posted at
http://www.samba.org/samba/security/
An unpatched server may be protected by ensuring that
non-administrative users are unable to read any winbindd
log files generated at level 5 or greater.
=======
Credits
=======
This security issue discovered during an internal security
audit of the Samba source code by the Samba Team.
==========================================================
== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
== The Samba Team
==========================================================
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