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Message-ID: <200604051200.ons__13713.0774710842$1144658099$gmane$org@psirt.cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2006 12:00:32 -0400
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@...co.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Cc: psirt@...co.com
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Optical Networking System 15000 series and Cisco Transport Controller Vulnerabilities
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Cisco Security Advisory
=======================
Cisco Optical Networking System 15000 series and Cisco Transport Controller
Vulnerabilities
===========================================================================
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20060405-ons.shtml
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060405-ons.shtml
Revision 1.0
============
For Public Release 2006 April 05 1500 GMT (UTC)
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
========
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of This Notice: FINAL
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the Cisco Optical Networking System
(ONS) 15310 Multi-service Provisioning Platforms (MSPP), ONS 15327
MSPP, ONS 15454 MSPP, ONS 15454 Multi-service Transport Platform
(MSTP) and the ONS 15600 MSPP. These vulnerabilities will affect
Optical nodes that have the Common Control Cards connected to a Data
Communications Network (DCN) and are enabled for Internet Protocol
Version 4 (IP). Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities will
result in a denial of service (DoS) of the Common Control Cards.
A separate vulnerability exists within the Cisco Transport Controller
(CTC) applet launcher which may allow execution of arbitrary code on
the CTC workstation. This software is downloaded from the Common
Control Cards when a management connection is made to the Optical
node.
Cisco has made free software available to address these
vulnerabilities for affected customers.
There are workarounds available to mitigate the effects of these
vulnerabilities.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060405-ons.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The following Cisco ONS 15000 series platforms are vulnerable, if
they are configured for either IP or OSPF on the LAN interface or
secure mode EMS-to-network-element access, and if they are
running unfixed releases of system software:
* Cisco ONS 15310-CL Series
* Cisco ONS 15327 Series
* Cisco ONS 15454 MSPP
* Cisco ONS 15454 MSTP
* Cisco ONS 15600 Series
Cisco Transport Controller versions 4.0.x and earlier are affected by
the CTC vulnerability.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
The following Cisco ONS 15000 series platforms are not vulnerable to
the Cisco ONS vulnerabilities listed above:
* Cisco ONS 15100 Series
* Cisco ONS 15200 Series
* Cisco ONS 15302, ONS 15305 and ONS 15310-MA platforms
* Cisco ONS 15500 Series
* Cisco ONS 15800 Series
Cisco Transport Controller versions 4.1.0 and later are not affected
by the CTC vulnerability.
No other Cisco ONS products are currently known to be affected by
these vulnerabilities.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
The affected Cisco ONS 15310-CL, ONS 15327, ONS 15454 MSPP/ONS 15454
MSTP, and ONS 15600 hardware is managed via the CTX, XTC, TCC2/TCC2+,
and TSC control cards respectively (here after referred to purely as
control card). These control cards are usually connected to a Data
Communications Network (DCN). In this context the term DCN is used to
denote the network that transports management information between a
management station and the network entity (NE). This definition of
DCN is sometimes referred to as Management Communication Network
(MCN). The DCN is usually physically or logically separated from the
customer network and isolated from the Internet. This limits the
exposure to the exploitation of these vulnerabilities from the
Internet.
ACK Denial of Service (DoS) attack
+---------------------------------
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID:
CSCei45910: ACK Denial of Service (DoS) attack
This vulnerability applies to all Cisco ONS NEs when IP is
configured on the Local Area Network (LAN) interface.
IP on the LAN interface is enabled by default.
NEs which are not enabled for IP on the LAN interface are not
affected by this vulnerability.
If an IP address has been entered into the IP address field on the
CTC navigation tab (Provisioning > Network > General), the device
is enabled for IP and is vulnerable if running an affected version
of software.
The NEs are susceptible to an ACK Denial of Service (DoS) attack on
multiple remote management TCP ports. Ports include:
80: HTTP
443: HTTPS
1080: SOCKS
2361: TL1
3081: TL1-LV
3082: TL1-RAW
3083: TL1-TELNET
57790: non-secure Internet Inter-ORB Protocol (IIOP) port
57791: Secure Socket Layer Inter-ORB Protocol (SSLIOP) port.
NOTE: Not all ports are open in all versions of system software.
The control card(s) on the network entity will exhaust memory
resources and be unable to open any new socket connections, and may
reset under continued attack. An ACK DoS attack is conducted by not
sending the final ACK required for a 3-way TCP handshake to complete,
and instead sending an invalid response to move the connection to an
invalid TCP state. Repeated attacks could cause both control cards to
be reset at the same time.
Control card resets with crafted IP packet
+-----------------------------------------
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID:
CSCsc51390: Control card resets with crafted IP packet
This vulnerability applies to all Cisco ONS NEs when IP is
configured on the LAN interface and secure mode for element
management system (EMS)-to-network-element access is enabled. The
NEs are susceptible to a DoS attack when receiving a specially
crafted IP packet.
NEs which are not enabled for secure mode EMS-to-network-element
access are not affected by this vulnerability.
Secure mode EMS-to-network-element access is disabled by default.
A device is vulnerable if via CTC, the following node level
navigation tab:
Provisioning > Security > Access
Has Access State checked for "secure", and is not vulnerable if it is
checked for "non-secure".
Repeated crafted IP packets could cause both the control cards to be
reset at the same time.
Control card resets with crafted IP packet
+-----------------------------------------
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID:
CSCsd04168: Control card resets with crafted IP packet
This vulnerability applies to all Cisco ONS NEs in which IP is
configured on the LAN interface. The NEs are susceptible to a Denial
of Service (DoS) attack when receiving a specially crafted IP packet.
NEs which are not enabled for IP on the LAN interface are not
affected by this vulnerability.
IP on the LAN interface is enabled by default.
If an IP address has been entered into the IP address field on the
CTC navigation tab (Provisioning > Network > General), the device
is enabled for IP and is vulnerable if running an affected version
of software.
Repeated crafted IP packets could cause both the control cards to be
reset at the same time.
Malformed OSPF packets cause control cards to reset
+--------------------------------------------------
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID:
CSCsc54558: Malformed OSPF packets cause control cards to reset
This vulnerability applies to all Cisco ONS NEs if Open Shortest
Path First (OSPF) routing protocol is configured on the LAN interface
of the control cards.
OSPF is a routing protocol defined by RFC 2328. It is designed to
manage IP routing inside an Autonomous System (AS). OSPF packets use
IP protocol number 89.
The vulnerability exists in the processing of OSPF packets that can
be exploited to cause a reset of the control cards. Since OSPF needs
to process unicast packets as well as multicast packets, this
vulnerability can be exploited remotely. It is also possible for an
attacker to target multiple systems on the local segment at a time.
NEs which are not enabled with OSPF on the LAN interface are not
affected by this vulnerability.
OSPF on the LAN interface is disabled by default.
A device is vulnerable if via CTC the following node level navigation
tab:
Provisioning > Network > OSPF
OSPF Active on LAN check box is ticked, and is not vulnerable if the
check box is not ticked.
java.policy permissions too broad for CTC Launcher
+-------------------------------------------------
This vulnerability is documented in bug ID:
CSCea25049: java.policy permissions too broad for CTC Launcher
This vulnerability applies to all workstations that may have had CTC
installed on them. CTC is a Java application that is installed in two
locations; CTC is stored on the control cards and it is downloaded to
the users workstation the first time they log into the NE with a new
software release.
During the CTC installation, an entry is made in the Java policy
file(s) granting all permission to any software originating from the
"codeBase", or source at "http://*/fs/LAUNCHER.jar".
Example:
grant codeBase "http://*/fs/LAUNCHER.jar" { permission
java.security.AllPermission; };
This may allow arbitrary code to be executed on the CTC computer,
should a user of the computer with CTC installed, access any web page
which runs Java code from /fs/LAUNCHER.jar location.
The Java policy files are the "java.policy" file(s) in the public
Java directories, typically ${java.home}/lib/security/java.policy
where the Java Plugin is installed, and the ".java.policy" file (note
the leading dot) in the user's home directory, typically
${user.home}/.java.policy.
In CTC versions 4.1.0 and later the launcher.jar file is signed.
Versions 4.1.0 and later will also detect the presence of the
java.policy entry and post a dialog box offering the user the option
to remove the entry.
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of:
* CSCei45910: ACK Denial of Service (DoS) attack
* CSCsc51390: Control card resets with crafted IP Packet
* CSCsd04168: Control card resets with crafted IP Packet
* CSCsc54558: Malformed OSPF packets cause control cards to reset
will result in the corresponding control cards resetting:
* On the Cisco ONS 15310-CL, ONS 15327 and ONS 15454 hardware,
whenever both the active and standby control cards are rebooting
at the same time, the synchronous data channels traversing the
switch drop traffic until the card reboots. Asynchronous data
channels traversing the switch are not impacted. Manageability
functions provided by the network element using the CTX, XTC,
TCC2/TCC2+ control cards are not available until the control card
reboots.
* On the Cisco ONS 15600 hardware, whenever both the active and
standby control cards are rebooting at the same time, there is no
impact to the data channels traversing the switch because the TSC
does a software reset which does not impact the timing being
provided by the TSC for the data channels. Manageability
functions provided by the network element through the TSC control
cards are not available until the control card reboots.
Successful exploitation of:
* CSCea25049: java.policy permissions too broad for CTC Launcher
With the insertion of the entry in the Java policy file(s)
granting all permission to any software originating from the
"codeBase", or source at "http://*/fs/LAUNCHER.jar", the CTC
installed workstation is vulnerable to execute malicious code
from a remote computer. Once executing the malicious version of
LAUNCHER.jar it will allow the program privilege level
"AllPermission" on the CTC installed workstation. This allows the
malicious program the ability to delete files, download private
information from the CTC installed workstation, modify files on
the CTC installed workstation, or load other executables.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Vulnerability | Affected Major Release | First Fixed Release |
|-------------------+------------------------+---------------------|
| | 1.X.X | Migrate to 4.1.8.1 |
| | | or later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.0.X or earlier | Migrate to 4.1.8.1 |
| | | or later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.1.X | 4.1.8.1 |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| ACK DoS Attack | 4.5.X | Migrate to 5.0.6 or |
| (CSCei45910) | | later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.6.X | 4.6.6 |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.7.X | Migrate to 5.0.6 or |
| | | later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 5.0.X | 5.0.6 |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 6.0.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 6.2.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 7.0.X | Not Vulnerable |
|-------------------+------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.0.X or earlier | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.1.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.5.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.6.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.7.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 5.0.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| Crafted IP Packet | 6.0.X | Migrate to 6.2.0 or |
| (CSCsc51390) | | later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 6.2.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 7.0.X | Not Vulnerable |
|-------------------+------------------------+---------------------|
| Crafted IP Packet | 4.1.X or earlier | 4.1.8.1 |
| (CSCsd04168) | | |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.5.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.6.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.7.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 5.0.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 6.0.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 6.2.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 7.0.X | Not Vulnerable |
|-------------------+------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.0.X or earlier | Migrate to 4.1.8.1 |
| | | or later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.1.X | 4.1.8.1 |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.5.X | Migrate to 6.2.0 or |
| | | later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| Malformed OSPF | 4.6.X | Migrate to 6.2.0 or |
| (CSCsc54558) | | later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.7.0 | Migrate to 6.2.0 or |
| | | later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 5.0.X | Migrate to 6.2.0 or |
| | | later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 6.0.X | Migrate to 6.2.0 or |
| | | later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 6.2.X | Not Vulnerable |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 7.0.X | Not Vulnerable |
|-------------------+------------------------+---------------------|
| | 1.X.X | Migrate to 4.1.0 or |
| | | later |
| CTC |------------------------+---------------------|
| (CSCea25049) | 4.0.X or earlier | Migrate to 4.1.0 or |
| | | later |
| |------------------------+---------------------|
| | 4.1.X or later | Not Vulnerable |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
Workarounds
===========
* The following general mitigation actions are relevant for all
the listed vulnerabilities:
Ensuring the DCN is physically or logically separated from the
customer network and isolated from the Internet will limit the
exposure to the exploitation of these vulnerabilities from the
Internet or customer networks.
Apply access control lists (ACLs) on routers, switches,
firewalls installed in front of the vulnerable network devices
such that TCP/IP traffic destined for the CTX, XTC, TCC2/TCC2+,
or TSC control cards on the ONS is allowed only from the network
management workstations. Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/tacl.html for examples on
how to apply ACLs on Cisco routers.
To prevent spoofed IP packets with the source IP address set to
that of the network management station from reaching the
management interface of the NE, leverage anti-spoofing
techniques. For more information on leveraging ACLs for
anti-spoofing, refer to
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/21.pdf and
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2827.txt.
The Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) feature helps
to mitigate problems that are caused by forged IP source
addresses that are passing through a router. Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios122/122cgcr/fsecur_c/fothersf/scfrpf.htm
for more information.
* CSCea25049 -- java.policy permissions too broad for CTC Launcher
Replace the "*" in the policy file entry with the IP address of
the CTC login node. Duplicate the entry for multiple login nodes.
Example:
Vulnerable entry within Java.policy files:
grant codeBase "http://*/fs/LAUNCHER.jar" { permission
java.security.AllPermission; };
Workaround entered within Java.policy files:
grant codeBase "http://192.0.2.1/fs/LAUNCHER.jar" { permission
java.security.AllPermission; };
* CSCsc51390 -- Control card resets with crafted IP Packet
A possible workaround is to have NEs disabled for secure mode
EMS-to-network-element access.
Caution: Cisco recommends that any remote management of a NE be
conducted over a secure protocol, such as SSH, SSL, or SSLIOP.
Cisco recommends that affected users upgrade to a fixed software
version of code.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as
otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact either "psirt@...co.com" or "security-alert@...co.com"
for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third-party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@...co.com
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the
TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
Status of This Notice: FINAL
======================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060405-ons.shtml.
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@...co.com
* first-teams@...st.org
* bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
* cisco@...t.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
* full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+-------------------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Revision 1.0 | 2006-April-05 | Initial public release |
| | | |
+------------------------------+------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt/.
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