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Message-ID: <OFF643DA8A.F5A224BC-ON882571FE.00771DA0-882571FE.007AA8ED@3com.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2006 15:19:47 -0700
From: TSRT@...m.com
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: TSRT-06-12: CA BrightStor Discovery Service Mailslot Buffer Overflow
 Vulnerability

TSRT-06-12: CA BrightStor Discovery Service Mailslot Buffer Overflow
            Vulnerability
http://www.tippingpoint.com/security/advisories/TSRT-06-12.html
October  5, 2006

-- CVE ID:
CVE-2006-5142

-- Affected Vendor:
Computer Associates

-- Affected Products:
BrightStor ARCserver Backup R11.5 Client
BrightStor ARCserver Backup R11.5 Server

-- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability since March 27, 2006 by Digital Vaccine protection
filter ID 4267. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS:

    http://www.tippingpoint.com 

-- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of Computer Associates ARCserver Backup.
Authentication is not required exploit this vulnerability and both the
client and server are affected.

The problem specifically exists within the handling of long messages
received over the Mailslot named 'CheyenneDS'. As no explicit
MaxMessageSize is supplied in the call to CreateMailslot, an attacker
can cause an exploitable stack-based buffer overflow.

The vulnerable Mailslot creation occurs:

   casdscsvc.exe -> Asbrdcst.dll
   20C14E8C push 0                  ; lpSecurityAttributes
   20C14E8E push 0                  ; lReadTimeout
   20C14E90 push 0                  ; nMaxMessageSize
   20C14E92 push offset Name        ; "\\\\.\\mailslot\\CheyenneDS"
   20C14E97 stosb
   20C14E98 call ds:CreateMailslotA
   20C14E9E cmp eax, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE
   20C14EA1 mov mailslot_handle, eax

Note there is no explicit MaxMessageSize specified. Later the mailslot
handle is read from into a 4k buffer. The read data is also passed to a
routine which calls vsprintf into a 1k buffer.

   casdscsvc.exe -> Asbrdcst.dll
   20C15024 mov eax, mailslot_handle
   20C15029 lea edx, [esp+1044h+Buffer_4k]
   20C1502D push ecx                          ; nNumberOfBytesToRead
   20C1502E push edx                          ; lpBuffer
   20C1502F push eax                          ; hFile
   20C15030 call edi ; ReadFile
   20C15032 test eax, eax
   20C15034 jz  short read_failed
   20C15036 lea ecx, [esp+3Dh]
   20C1503A push ecx                          ; char
   20C1503B push offset str_ReadmailslotS     ; "ReadMailSlot: %s\n"
   20C15040 call not_interesting_call_to_vsnprtinf
   20C15045 add esp, 8
   20C15048 lea edx, [esp+3Dh]
   20C1504C push edx                          ; va_list
   20C1504D push offset str_ReadmailslotS_0   ; "ReadMailSlot: %s"
   20C15052 push 0                            ; for_debug_log
   20C15054 call vsprintf_into_1024_stack_buf_and_debug_log

As mentioned in TSRT-06-02, exploitation of this vulnerability is
possible due to the ability to exceeding the second-class Mailslot
message size limitation.

-- Vendor Response:
Computer Associates has issued an update to correct this vulnerability.
More details can be found at:
 
    supportconnectw.ca.com/public/storage/infodocs/basbr-secnotice.asp

-- Disclosure Timeline:
2006.03.27 - Digital Vaccine released to TippingPoint customers
2006.04.27 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2006.10.05 - Coordinated public release of advisory

-- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by Pedram Amini, TippingPoint Security
Research Team.

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