bugtraq - Whitepaper: Implementing and Detecting a PCI Rootkit

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Message-ID: <Pine.WNT.4.64.0611161740500.3584@j2.ngstest.local>
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2006 17:42:23 +0000 (GMT Standard Time)
From: John Heasman <john@...software.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Whitepaper: Implementing and Detecting a PCI Rootkit

Hi guys,

I have released a paper entitled "Implementing and Detecting a PCI 
Rootkit" which is available here:

http://www.ngssoftware.com/research/papers/Implementing_And_Detecting_A_PCI_Rootkit.pdf

I was originally planning to release this early in 2007 but due to the 
recent publication of "BIOS Disassembly Ninjutsu Uncovered" by Darmawan 
Salihun I have decided to publish now (please note, I have not yet seen 
the contents of this book).

Abstract:

"In February 2006, the author presented a means of persisting a rootkit in 
the system BIOS via the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI). 
It was demonstrated that the ACPI tables within the BIOS could be modified 
to contain malicious ACPI Machine Language (AML) instructions that 
interacted with system memory and the I/O space, allowing the rootkit 
bootstrap code to overwrite kernel code and data structures as a means of 
deployment.

Whilst using ACPI as a means of persisting a rootkit in the system BIOS 
has numerous advantages for the rootkit writer over "traditional" means of 
persistence (that include storing the rootkit on disk and loading it as a 
device driver), there are several technologies that are designed to 
mitigate this threat.  Both Intel SecureFlash and Phoenix TrustedCore 
motherboards prevent the system BIOS from being overwritten with unsigned 
updates.

This paper discusses means of persisting a rootkit on a PCI device 
containing a flashable expansion ROM.  Previous work in the Trusted 
Computing field has noted the feasibility of expansion ROM attacks (which 
is in part the problem that this field has set out to solve), however the 
practicalities of implementing such attacks has not been discussed in 
detail.  Furthermore, there is little knowledge of how to detect and 
prevent such attacks on systems that do not contain a Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM).  Whilst the discussion mainly focuses on the Microsoft 
Windows platform, it should be noted that the techniques are equally 
likely to apply to other operating systems."

Thanks

John

-- 
John Heasman
Director of Research
NGS Software Ltd

Tel    +44 (0) 208 401 0070
Fax    +44 (0) 208 401 0076
http://www.ngssoftware.com

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