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Message-ID: <456349C9.5010506@0xcafebabe.it>
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2006 19:47:37 +0100
From: revenge <revenge@...afebabe.it>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: ContentNow CMS 1.39 Sql Injection + Path Disclosure Vulnerabilities
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ContentNow CMS 1.39 'pageid' Sql Injection + Path Disclosure
Severity : Medium Risk
Vendor : http://www.contentnow.mf4k.de/
Author : Revenge
[--------------------------------------------------]
[#] Description
ContentNow is a PHP Content Management System web 2.0 compliant, more
info can be found at vendor site.
ContentNow v1.39 is vulnerable to a sql injection and path disclosure.
[--------------------------------------------------]
Vuln #1 : Sql Injection
Impact : Admin credentials disclosure
Exploit : http://www.0xcafebabe.it/sploits/contentnow_139_sqlinj.pl
(Works regardless of magic quotes)
The "pageid" parameter in "index.php" isn't properly sanitised before
being used in a sql query, this can be exploited to manipulate existing
SQL query by inserting arbitrary SQL code, which can disclose sensitive
information like admin credentials.
The problem is due to:
[ index.php ]
...
...
// get/set id or startpageid from config
--> $pid = $_GET['pageid'];
if (empty($pid) || $pid == 1) $pid =
$cnEngine->configArray[0]['startpageid'];
--> if (false == $cnEngine->checkPid($pid)) die ('<span
style="font:13px sans-serif;">Error loading site. No pid found.</span>');
$cnEngine->setId($pid);
...
...
[ function checkPid($pid) and getActualContent($param) from
/cn/library/class.engine.php ]
...
...
function checkPid($pid) {
$cnDatabase = NewADOConnection(ADODB_DB_TYPE);
$cnDatabase->Connect(CN_DB_HOST, CN_DB_USER,
CN_DB_PASSWORD, CN_DB_NAME);
$sql = "SELECT pageid FROM ".CN_TBL_SECTIONS." WHERE
pageid = ".$pid;
$res = $cnDatabase->Execute($sql);
if ($res->RecordCount() > 0) {
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
...
...
function getActualContent($param = '') {
$cnDatabase = NewADOConnection(ADODB_DB_TYPE);
$cnDatabase->Connect(CN_DB_HOST, CN_DB_USER,
CN_DB_PASSWORD, CN_DB_NAME);
$sql = "SELECT ".TABLE_FIELDS_CONTENT." FROM
".CN_TBL_CONTENT.$this->contentLanguageSuffix." WHERE pid =
".$this->pageid." AND deleted = 0 ".$param." ORDER by sort ASC";
$res = $cnDatabase->Execute($sql);
if ($res->RecordCount() > 0) {
while ($row = $res->FetchRow()) {
$row['contenttitle'] =
stripslashes($row['contenttitle']);
$row['contentsyskey'] =
stripslashes($row['contentsyskey']);
$row['contentsubtitle'] =
stripslashes($row['contentsubtitle']);
$row['content'] =
str_replace('\"','"',$row['content']);
$contentArray[] = $row;
}
}
$this->contentArray = $contentArray;
return $contentArray;
}
As you can see there's no input validation on "pageid" parameter.
Vuln #2: It is also possible to disclose the full path to index.php by
requesting index.php?pageid='
[--------------------------------------------------]
[#] Solution
Download 1.40 version.
[#] Disclosure timeline
2006/11/20 Bug discovered
2006/11/20 Vendor contacted
2006/11/21 Vendor response
2006/11/21 New version 1.40 released
2006/11/21 Public Disclosure
Revenge
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