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Message-ID: <OpenPKG-SA-2006.039@openpkg.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2006 23:56:06 +0100
From: OpenPKG GmbH <openpkg-noreply@...npkg.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [OpenPKG-SA-2006.039] OpenPKG Security Advisory (proftpd)
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____________________________________________________________________________
Publisher Name: OpenPKG GmbH
Publisher Home: http://openpkg.com/
Advisory Id (public): OpenPKG-SA-2006.039
Advisory Type: OpenPKG Security Advisory (SA)
Advisory Directory: http://openpkg.com/go/OpenPKG-SA
Advisory Document: http://openpkg.com/go/OpenPKG-SA-2006.039
Advisory Published: 2006-12-15 23:55 UTC
Issue Id (internal): OpenPKG-SI-20061215.01
Issue First Created: 2006-12-15
Issue Last Modified: 2006-12-15
Issue Revision: 07
____________________________________________________________________________
Subject Name: ProFTPD
Subject Summary: Professional FTP Daemon
Subject Home: http://www.proftpd.org/
Subject Versions: * < 1.3.1rc1
Vulnerability Id: CVE-2006-6563
Vulnerability Scope: global (not OpenPKG specific)
Attack Feasibility: run-time
Attack Vector: remote network
Attack Impact: denial of service, privilege escalation,
arbitrary code execution
Description:
A vulnerability exists in the FTP server ProFTPD, versions up to
and including 1.3.0a. The vulnerability is caused by a stack-based
buffer overflow in the "pr_ctrls_recv_request" function of the
"Controls" feature. This is an optional feature of ProFTPD server
which is by default disabled in OpenPKG and that must be explicitly
activated with the "with_ctrls" build-time option of the OpenPKG
"profptd" package.
Controls are a way to communicate directly with a standalone ProFTPD
daemon while it is running. This provides administrators a way to
alter the daemon's behavior in real time, without having to restart
the daemon and have it re-read its configuration. The Controls
feature allows authorized users to locally manage parameters of the
ProFTPD servers, like aborting connections, managing users, changing
log levels, disabling individual virtual servers, etc.
The vulnerability allows local attackers with access to the
Controls features (and who have been allowed by Controls ACLs
in "proftpd.conf") to execute arbitrary code or even gain root
privileges.
References:
[0] http://www.proftpd.org/
____________________________________________________________________________
Primary Package Name: proftpd
Primary Package Home: http://openpkg.org/go/package/proftpd
Corrected Distribution: Corrected Branch: Corrected Package:
OpenPKG Enterprise E1.0-SOLID proftpd-1.3.0-E1.0.2
____________________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________________
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