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Message-Id: <200701090207.l09273QL015353@faron.mitre.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2007 21:07:03 -0500 (EST)
From: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...re.org>
To: jgraef@...rs.sourceforge.net
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: OpenPinboard <= Remote File Include
Remote file inclusion does not seem possible - the only relevant
code is this:
require_once("languages/$language.php");
Since the "languages/" string will always appear first, you can't
inject an "http://" or similar to the front of the string, so remote
file inclusion is not possible.
OK, so we need to consider directory traversal sequences a la ".." for
local file inclusion.
It appears that directory traversal might be exploitable before
product installation is complete.
Before the require_once statement, we have:
if (file_get_contents("locked")!="locked") header("location: install.php");
require_once("config.php");
As has been observed by various people, merely printing a Location
header will not prevent execution of the rest of the application. So,
the require_once() will always be executed.
In 2.0 and 2.0.1, config.php is empty - at least until the admin has
finished installation using install.php.
So, before installation is complete, $language (and other variables)
are not set to any values. Assuming register_globals is enabled,
there is a small time window during which the attacker might insert
".." (and probably "%00"?) into the $language parameter to include
local files.
After the admin has properly run install.php, $language is inserted
into config.php, preventing this particular exploit.
Unfortunately, during the post-disclosure analysis of install.php, I
might have found a serious issue involving code execution but not RFI.
I will privately work with the developer to address the problem, then
follow up to the list.
- Steve
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