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Date: Mon, 05 Feb 2007 07:25:51 -0600 From: "Gerald (Jerry) Carter" <jerry@...ba.org> To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Cc: security@...ba.org Subject: [SAMBA-SECURITY] CVE-2007-0452: Potential DoS against smbd in Samba 3.0.6 - 3.0.23d -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ========================================================== == == Subject: Potential Denial of Service bug in smbd == CVE ID#: CVE-2007-0452 == == Versions: Samba 3.0.6 - 3.0.23d (inclusive) == == Summary: A logic error in the deferred open code == can lead to an infinite loop in smbd == ========================================================== =========== Description =========== Internally Samba's file server daemon, smbd, implements support for deferred file open calls in an attempt to serve client requests that would otherwise fail due to a share mode violation. When renaming a file under certain circumstances it is possible that the request is never removed from the deferred open queue. smbd will then become stuck is a loop trying to service the open request. This bug may allow an authenticated user to exhaust resources such as memory and CPU on the server by opening multiple CIFS sessions, each of which will normally spawn a new smbd process, and sending each connection into an infinite loop. ================== Patch Availability ================== A patch against Samba 3.0.23d has been attached to this email. This fix has be incorporated into the Samba 3.0.24 release. Patches are also available from at the Samba Security page (http://www.samba.org/samba/security). ========== Workaround ========== The bug is believed to be exploitable only by an authenticated user. The server's exposure can be alleviated by disabling any suspect or hostile user accounts. ======= Credits ======= This vulnerability was found during internal regression testing by Samba developers. ========================================================== == Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility. == The Samba Team ========================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFFxzBfIR7qMdg1EfYRAgpMAKCBiRQFeyl598Bf2V7WPxOEVZjQRQCgtQh7 ualQZpxcejQhlaYVxbKVpqg= =V048 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- View attachment "smbd_deferred_open_v2.patch" of type "text/plain" (6015 bytes) View attachment "smbd_deferred_open_v2.patch.asc" of type "text/plain" (197 bytes)
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