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Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0702271423130.21707@dione>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2007 14:29:11 +0100 (CET)
From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...ne.ids.pl>
To: Richard Moore <rich@...tpoint.ltd.uk>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com,
security@...illa.org
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Firefox onUnload + document.write() memory
corruption vulnerability (MSIE7 null ptr)
On Tue, 27 Feb 2007, Richard Moore wrote:
> <html>
> <body onunload="location = self.location">
> <a href="http://slashdot.org/">http://slashdot.org/</a>
> </body>
> </html>
Yeah, and the other way round: http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/ietrap/, when
used with FF 2.0.0.2, puts you on a page that:
1) Has URL bar data and favicon from the target site,
2) Views source of what you added with document.write(),
3) Displays as blank.
Moreover, repeatedly setting document.location = "xxx"; on departure may
land you at slashdot.org/xxx instead (meaning the update is being
performed in the context of the new page).
Although this looks like a Really Bad Thing (tm), I didn't succeed in
modifying /ietrap/ to display a malicious payload (though feels like it's
sooo close), nor in manipulating DOM in the latter example to do anything
other than annoying the user (because 2.0.0.1 kept crashing ;-). Still,
I'm not gonna sleep well until this is fixed.
/mz
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