Message-ID: <873177288.20070310000106@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>
Date: Sat, 10 Mar 2007 00:01:06 +0300
From: 3APA3A <3APA3A@...URITY.NNOV.RU>
To: "Laundrup, Jens" <Jens.Laundrup@...ROKC.GOV>
Cc: "Tim" <tim-security@...tinelchicken.org>,
	full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Re[2]: [Full-disclosure] Microsoft Windows Vista/2003/XP/2000 file management security issues

Dear Laundrup, Jens,

C:\TEMP is not best example, but there are another.

Microsoft  Word creates temporary file with predictable name in the same
directory with document. In the case of directory permissions like:

Users: Add & List
Creator Owner: Full control

(one user should not read documents created by another user)

it  may  creates  security issue. And you may attempt to exploit it with
"preopen  files".

Tim  is right, it's attack vector, not vulnerability. You must have this
attack vector in mind during application development and administration.
I don't know if attack against e.g. Microsoft Word will work, it need to
be tested.

--Friday, March 9, 2007, 9:12:10 PM, you wrote to tim-security@...tinelchicken.org:

LJ> Pardon me for maybe being a little naïve here, but the situation you state:

LJ> "I have conducted code reviews on several commercial apps which
LJ> use C:\TEMP in very insecure ways to store sensitive data."  

LJ> That would certainly seem to me that a programmer and the QA
LJ> process failed.  I struggle to see where Windows is to blame for
LJ> that.  I am no "Windows lover" but as a working security
LJ> professional, I see as much poorly written code junking up Linux,
LJ> Unix, Apples (yes we have them all) as I see with Windows, yet in
LJ> those situations, will you blame the OS there too?  I think it is
LJ> time you take the bias you have, set it aside and look at the
LJ> statement you made which was concise, accurate and factual, then
LJ> point the blame where it belongs; at the code writers whose code you
LJ> review!.  

LJ> Cheers

LJ> Jens 


LJ> -----Original Message-----
LJ> From: Tim [mailto:tim-security@...tinelchicken.org] 
LJ> Sent: Friday, March 09, 2007 8:20 AM
LJ> To: Roger A. Grimes
LJ> Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com; full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
LJ> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Microsoft Windows
LJ> Vista/2003/XP/2000 file management security issues

LJ> Roger,

>> But we'll have to agree to disagree. Your security scenarios are just
>> bizarre. It's a lot easier to hack people then going through all the
>> interations you suggest.
>>
>> For one, I've been a sys admin for 20 years and NEVER created a
>> private folder under a public folder. Not in my Novell days, not in my
>> Windows days. The only time I've seen a private folder created under a
>> public folder is the \Users folder, and in that case, the users only
>> have Read and List access to the parent \Users folder, and then Full
>> Control to their own folders.

LJ> I find your assessment somewhat short-sighted.  It seems some of these attacks would be
LJ> possible in those situations.

LJ> Sure, Windows is already pathetically insecure against an attackers
LJ> already on the local system, but this would be yet another attack
LJ> vector.

LJ> tim

LJ> _______________________________________________
LJ> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
LJ> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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