bugtraq - [MajorSecurity Advisory #42]webblizzard CMS - Cross Site Scripting and Session fixation Issues

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Message-ID: <20070407144117.30022.qmail@securityfocus.com>
Date: 7 Apr 2007 14:41:17 -0000
From: Securityaudit@...orsecurity.de
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [MajorSecurity Advisory #42]webblizzard CMS - Cross Site
 Scripting and Session fixation Issues

[MajorSecurity Advisory #42]webblizzard CMS - Cross Site Scripting and Session fixation Issues

Details
=======
Product: webblizzard CMS
Remote-Exploit: yes
Vendor-URL: http://www.webblizzard.de/
Vendor-Status: informed
Advisory-Status: published

Credits
============
Discovered by: David Vieira-Kurz
http://www.majorsecurity.de

Original Advisory:
============
http://www.majorsecurity.de/index_2.php?major_rls=major_rls42

Introduction
============
webblizzard CMS is a Content Management System.

More Details
============
1. Cross Site Scripting:
Input passed directly to the "Suchzeile" parameter in "index_cms.php" is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user.
This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site. 

2. Session fixation:
The Cookie variable "PHPSESSID" can be set to a malicious and arbitrary value.

2.1 Classification:
Session Fixation is an attack technique that forces a user's session ID to an explicit value.
Depending on the functionality of the target web site, a number of techniques can be utilized to "fix" the session ID value.
These techniques range from Cross-site Scripting exploits to peppering the web site with previously made HTTP requests.
After a user's session ID has been fixed, the attacker will wait for them to login.
Once the user does so, the attacker uses the predefined session ID value to assume their online identity.

Workaround: 
============
1. Do not accept session identifiers from GET / POST variables:
Session identifiers in URL (query string, GET variables) or POST variables are not recommended as it simplifies this attack - it is easy to make links or forms which sets GET / POST variables.

2.Regenerate SID on each request:
A powerful countermeassure against session fixation is to "regenerate" session identifier (SID) on each request.
This means that although attacker may trick a user into accepting a known SID, the SID will be invalid when attacker attempts to re-use the SID.

3. Accept only server generated SID:
One way to improve security is to not accept session identifiers not generated by server.

if ( ! isset( $_SESSION['SERVER_GENERATED_SID'] ) ) {
session_destroy(); // destroy all data in session
}
session_regenerate_id(); // generate a new session identifier
$_SESSION['SERVER_GENERATED_SID'] = true;

References:
-------------------------------------------------
http://www.acrossecurity.com/papers/session_fixation.pdf
http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/classes/session_fixation.shtml

History/Timeline
================
30.03.2007 discovery of the vulnerabilities
02.04.2007 contacted the vendor
07.04.2007 advisory is written
07.04.2007 advisory released

MajorSecurity
=======
MajorSecurity is a non-profit German penetration testing and security research project
which consists of only one person at the present time.
http://www.majorsecurity.de/