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Message-ID: <20070513192740.13DE.0@paddy.troja.mff.cuni.cz>
Date: Sun, 13 May 2007 20:14:22 +0200 (CEST)
From: Pavel Kankovsky <peak@...o.troja.mff.cuni.cz>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: squirrelmail CSRF vulnerability

On Sat, 12 May 2007, Josh Zlatin-Amishav wrote:

> On Fri, 11 May 2007, Tim Newsham wrote:
> 
> > This might just be semantics:  I wouldn't consider the XSS attack to be a 
> > CSRF attack.
> 
> The point is, if the application is vulnerable to an XSS vulnerability
> then having a CSRF token wont protect you from a CSRF attack. The
> attacker could use the XSS vector to steal the CSRF token, much like the
> Samy worm worked.

Let's have an HTTP server with a buffer overflow vulnerability making it
possible to run arbitrary code. We can use the vulnerability to read
files outside the document root (perhaps using relative pathnames like
"../../../file") but I don't think this means we should call such an
attack "a path traversal".

--Pavel Kankovsky aka Peak  [ Boycott Microsoft--http://www.vcnet.com/bms ]
"Resistance is futile. Open your source code and prepare for assimilation."

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