bugtraq - Re: Defeating Citibank Virtual Keyboard protection using screenshot method

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Date: Thu, 17 May 2007 15:56:39 +0000 (UTC)
From: "mailbox@...tinelli.com" <john@...tinelli.com>
To: <sethb@...ix.com>, <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Re: Defeating Citibank Virtual Keyboard protection using screenshot
 method


> If malware is running on the user's computer, can it change the
> destination of a funds transfer invisibly to the user, and still 
have
> the verification work?

Theoretically, this is possible. An advanced client-side MITM attack 
could be crafted, altering packets on-the-fly and returning a false 
confirmation page.

i.e.: 

normal response: "$100 USD has been transferred from your@...il.com to 
evil@...ker.com"
altered response: "$100 USD has been transferred from your@...il.com 
to your@...ipient.com"

-John Martinelli
RedLevel.org Security