bugtraq - Re: Defeating Citibank Virtual Keyboard protection using screenshot method

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Message-Id: <E1HoXCY-00086n-4p@mail.enterto.com>
Date: Wed, 16 May 2007 21:02:54 -0700
From: sethb@...ix.com
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Defeating Citibank Virtual Keyboard protection using screenshot method

Hugo van der Kooij <hvdkooij@...derkooij.org> wrote:

> In fact the system used by the major Dutch banks is audited rather
> extensively. The OTP system is based on an external smartcard reader
> and a smartcard application on the bank card. They have no physical
> connection so the web interfcae will present you with a challenge
> and you must use that challeng, your card and your pin to generate
> the proper response.  Then you have to type in this response.

What is included in the "signed" stuff, and when is that
challenge/response done?

If malware is running on the user's computer, can it change the
destination of a funds transfer invisibly to the user, and still have
the verification work?

That is, user enters "Pay 100 to Credit Card".  The malware sends the
bank "Pay 100 to Bad Guy".  The bank tells the user "Verify transfer
of 100 from your account".  Oops.

Seth