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Message-ID: <1106521557.20070711183004@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>
Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2007 18:30:04 +0400
From: 3APA3A <3APA3A@...URITY.NNOV.RU>
To: "Paul Craig" <paul.craig@...urity-assessment.com>
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: TippingPoint IPS Signature Evasion
Dear Paul Craig,
--Wednesday, July 11, 2007, 1:37:03 AM, you wrote to bugtraq@...urityfocus.com:
PC> http://www.test.com/scripts%c0%afcmd.exe
PC> http://www.test.com/scripts%e0%80%afcmd.exe
PC> http://www.test.com/scripts%c1%9ccmd.exe
PC> Web servers located behind a Tippingpoint IPS device which are capable
PC> of decoding alternate Unicode characters can be accessed, and exploited
PC> without triggering the IPS device.
Can you, please, provide example of such server? Fatih Ozavci reported
similar problem with Checkpoint and Halfwidth/Fullwidth Unicode,
potential attack vector was IIS with .Net framework, in this case IIS
seems not to be exploitable.
Blaming IPS it does not detect attack which is impossible in-the-wild is
nonsense. Blaming corporate-level IPS doesn't detect attack against SOHO
web server is acceptable nonsense :)
--
~/ZARAZA http://securityvulns.com/
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