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Message-ID: <OF0BD4B1F9.60509487-ON88257317.0004BD33-88257317.0004F0BD@3com.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2007 17:54:00 -0700
From: TSRT@...m.com
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com,
	vulnwatch@...nwatch.org, vulndiscuss@...nwatch.org
Cc: zdi-disclosures@...m.com
Subject: TPTI-07-12: Multiple Vendor Progress Server Heap Overflow Vulnerability

TPTI-07-12: Multiple Vendor Progress Server Heap Overflow Vulnerability
http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com/advisory/TPTI-07-12.html
July 12, 2007

-- CVE ID:
CVE-2007-2417

-- Affected Vendor:
Progress Software

-- Affected Products:
RSA Authentication Manager
Progress Database

-- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability since May 22, 2007 by Digital Vaccine protection
filter ID 5326. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS:

    http://www.tippingpoint.com 

-- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of RSA Authentication Manager and other
products that include the Progress server. User interaction is not
required to exploit this vulnerability.

The specific flaw exists in the Progress Server listening by default on
TCP ports 5520 and 5530. The _mprosrv.exe process trusts a user-supplied
DWORD size and attempts to receive that amount of data into a statically
allocated heap buffer. 

The user-supplied size parameter is used directly as an argument to
recv() as shown below:

_mprosrv.exe:
    0044F24F mov     eax, [esp+42Ch+buf] ; 1012 byte heap buffer
    0044F253 push    0                   ; flags
    0044F255 push    esi                 ; attacker-controlled size
    0044F256 push    eax                 ; 1012 byte heap buffer
    0044F257 push    edi                 ; s
    0044F258 call    recv

The heap buffer which is received into is 1012 bytes. Sending more than
1012 bytes will overflow into subsequent heap chunks. This heap
corruption can be leveraged by an attacker to execute arbitrary code in
the context of the SYSTEM user.

-- Vendor Response:
RSA has made hot fixes available to registered users through RSA
Customer Support. For more information, please visit the RSA website
for the appropriate product:

For RSA ACE/Server 5.2, apply the following hot fix on top of Patch 1:
 
 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_as52p.asp

For RSA Authentication Manager 6.0, apply the following hot fix on top
of the Patch 2 -  (scroll down to the second half of the page)
 
 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_am60p2.asp

For RSA SecurID Appliance 2.0, apply the following hot fix on top of
the Upgrade 2.0.1:
 
 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_app.asp

For RSA Authentication Manager 6.1, apply the 6.1.2 patch:
 
 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_am60p2.asp

RSA recommends that all customers using RSA ACE/Server 5.2, RSA
Authentication Manager 6.0 and 6.1, and RSA SecurID Appliance 2.0
install the hot fixes. RSA states "Notification was recently (June 28,
2007) sent to RSA SecurCare customers about the vulnerability and the
correct way to resolve it.

-- Disclosure Timeline:
2007.03.14 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2007.05.22 - Digital Vaccine released to TippingPoint customers
2007.07.12 - Coordinated public release of advisory

-- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by Aaron Portnoy, TippingPoint DVLabs.

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