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Date: Sat, 6 Oct 2007 19:06:51 +0200
From: Thierry Zoller <Thierry@...ler.lu>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re[2]: [Full-disclosure] URI handling woes in Acrobat Reader, Netscape,Miranda, Skype

Dear Geo.,

G> If the application is what exposes the URI handling routine to untrusted
G> code from the internet,
Sorry, Untrusted code from the internet ?

The user clicks on a mailto link, is that untrusted code?
Or the mailto link is clicked for him.

Anyways, the mailto link
POST IE7 has a flaw/threat/vulnerablity it hasn't had PRE IE7.

G>  then it's the application's job to make sure that
G> code is trusted before exposing system components to it's commands, no?
Yes to a certain degree it is, like I said mitigation is fine, though
it shouldn't be the final word here, _if_ my assumptions I derive from
the things I know and just tested are correct. I might be wrong, but I
dont' think so =)

The problem here is the root cause, the root cause is that IE7
introduced a problem, you can call it "vulnerability" or "Threat" or
whatever floats your boat, I don't care, my point is, in my opinion
the handler itself is broken.


-- 
http://secdev.zoller.lu
Thierry Zoller
Fingerprint : 5D84 BFDC CD36 A951 2C45  2E57 28B3 75DD 0AC6 F1C7

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