bugtraq - Re: [Full-disclosure] URI handling woes in Acrobat Reader, Netscape, Miranda, Skype

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Message-ID: <5980.1191770461@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Sun, 07 Oct 2007 11:21:01 -0400
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To: "Geo." <geoincidents@....net>
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] URI handling woes in Acrobat Reader, Netscape, Miranda, Skype

On Sat, 06 Oct 2007 12:43:16 EDT, "Geo." said:

> If the application is what exposes the URI handling routine to untrusted 
> code from the internet, then it's the application's job to make sure that 
> code is trusted before exposing system components to it's commands, no?

I think that given a system service that says "I will handle a mailto: URI",
that a programmer can *reasonably* expect the following:

1) That it will be handed to a program that actually does e-mail, and not
a calculator.  calc.exe hasn't *yet* followed the programming aphorism that
every program grows until it can read e-mail.

2) That said program can protect itself against overtly malicious input.

"When people pcp a chocky in their mouth, they don't expect steel bolts to
string out and pierce their cheeks" -- Monty Python.

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