bugtraq - Buffer-overflow and format string in VideoLAN VLC 0.8.6d

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Date: Mon, 24 Dec 2007 18:18:32 +0100
From: Luigi Auriemma <aluigi@...istici.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, bugs@...uritytracker.com,
	news@...uriteam.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk,
	vuln@...unia.com, packet@...ketstormsecurity.org
Subject: Buffer-overflow and format string in VideoLAN VLC 0.8.6d


#######################################################################

                             Luigi Auriemma

Application:  VideoLAN (VLC)
              http://www.videolan.org
Versions:     <= 0.8.6d
Platforms:    Windows, Mac, *BSD, *nix and more
Bugs:         A] buffer-overflow in the handling of the subtitles
                 (originally found by Michal Luczaj)
              B] format string in the web interface
Exploitation: A] local
              B] remote
Date:         24 Dec 2007
Author:       Luigi Auriemma
              e-mail: aluigi@...istici.org
              web:    aluigi.org


#######################################################################


1) Introduction
2) Bugs
3) The Code
4) Fix


#######################################################################

===============
1) Introduction
===============


VideoLAN (VLC) is one of the most famous and used media players for
various reasons: simple to use, open source, multi platform, many
features available, continuosly updated and more.


#######################################################################

=======
2) Bugs
=======

---------------------------------------------------
A] buffer-overflow in the handling of the subtitles
---------------------------------------------------

VLC is able to handle the subtitles automatically in a very simple way,
it just checks the presence of ssa files with the same name of the
loaded video and a possible subtitles folder.
The functions which handle the MicroDvd, SSA and Vplayer subtitle
formats are vulnerable to some stack based buffer-overflow
vulnerabilities which can allow an attacker to execute malicious code.

from modules\demux\subtitle.c:

static int ParseMicroDvd( demux_t *p_demux, subtitle_t *p_subtitle )
    ...
    char buffer_text[MAX_LINE + 1];
    ...
        if( sscanf( s, "{%d}{}%[^\r\n]", &i_start, buffer_text ) == 2 ||
            sscanf( s, "{%d}{%d}%[^\r\n]", &i_start, &i_stop, buffer_text ) == 3)

static int  ParseSSA( demux_t *p_demux, subtitle_t *p_subtitle )
    ...
    char buffer_text[ 10 * MAX_LINE];
    char buffer_text2[ 10 * MAX_LINE];
    ...
        if( sscanf( s,
                    "Dialogue: %[^,],%d:%d:%d.%d,%d:%d:%d.%d,%[^\r\n]",
                    buffer_text2,
                    &h1, &m1, &s1, &c1,
                    &h2, &m2, &s2, &c2,
                    buffer_text ) == 10 )

static int  ParseVplayer( demux_t *p_demux, subtitle_t *p_subtitle )
    ...
    char buffer_text[MAX_LINE + 1];
    ...
        if( sscanf( p, "%d:%d:%d%[ :]%[^\r\n]", &h, &m, &s, &c, buffer_text ) == 5 )


As written in the header of this advisory, these buffer-overflow bugs
have been originally found and reported by Michal Luczaj this summer
and the strange thing is that the SVN is fixed from that time BUT the
current 0.8.6d (both executables and source code!) is still vulnerable.
References:

http://mailman.videolan.org/pipermail/vlc-devel/2007-June/032672.html
http://mailman.videolan.org/pipermail/vlc-devel/2007-June/033394.html
http://trac.videolan.org/vlc/browser/trunk/modules/demux/subtitle.c?rev=20715


-------------------------------------
B] format string in the web interface
-------------------------------------

VLC can be controlled remotely through a nice web interface (a mini
http server) which runs by default on port 8080.
The instructions which handle the Connection parameter sent by the
client pass its content to the httpd_MsgAdd function without the
needed format argument.
In addition the new formatted Connection field is also sent back by the
server in its reply, very useful for the attacker to tune the own
exploit for increasing the percentage of success of the attack.

from network\httpd.c:

static int httpd_FileCallBack( httpd_callback_sys_t *p_sys, httpd_client_t *cl, httpd_message_t *answer, httpd_message_t *query )
    ...
    psz_connection = httpd_MsgGet( &cl->query, "Connection" );
    if( psz_connection != NULL )
    {
        httpd_MsgAdd( answer, "Connection", psz_connection );
    }


#######################################################################

===========
3) The Code
===========


http://aluigi.org/poc/vlcboffs.zip

A] open vlcbof.avi and the ssa subtitle will be loaded automatically

B] nc SERVER 8080 -v -v < vlcfs.txt


#######################################################################

======
4) Fix
======


Current SVN is fixed.
The nightly builds are available here:

  http://nightlies.videolan.org


#######################################################################


--- 
Luigi Auriemma
http://aluigi.org