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Message-ID: <47B2D59F.4010801@reversemode.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2008 12:33:51 +0100
From: Reversemode <advisories@...ersemode.com>
To: Securityfocus <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: [Reversemode Advisory] February Advisories : Microsoft Word 2003
+ Fortinet Forticlient
Hi
----------------------------
1.Microsoft Word Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Microsoft Word 2003 is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability while
parsing a specially crafted Word file. The vulnerability is caused by
calculation errors while parsing certain fields within the barely
documented, File Information Block (FIB).
This could lead to remote arbitrary code execution in the context of the
user who started the application.
Microsoft has addressed this issue (among others) in its february
bulletin: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS08-009.mspx
Disclosure Timeline:
07/02/2007 - Vendor Contacted
07/02/2007 - Vendor Acknowledged
01/10/2008 - Vendor confirms vulnerability and plans to fix it.
02/12/2008 - Coordinated disclosure
--------------------------------------------------------
2. Fortinet FortiClient Local Privilege Escalation.
Fortinet Endpoint Solution For Enterprise, FortiClient is prone to a
local privilege escalation due to the improper device filtering carried
out by its filter driver, fortimon.sys .
The driver affected filters certain devices, enabling pass-through
filtering. However, its own Device's DeviceExtension is not correclty
initialized so any logged user could force the kernel to operate with
user-mode controlled memory just by direclty issuing a special request
to the driver's device.
This leads to local arbitrary code execution in the context of the
kernel. Even Guest users can elevate privileges to SYSTEM.
This issue has been addressed in the following releases:
+ FortiClient 3.0 MR5 Patch 4
+ FortiClient 3.0 MR6
Affected versions:
+ FortiClient 3.0 MR5 Patch 3 and lower
Users can consult the patches via http://docs.forticare.com/firmware.xml
Disclosure Timeline:
01/18/2008 - Vendor Contacted
01/18/2008 - Vendor Acknowledged
01/29/2008 - Vendor confirms vulnerability and plans to fix it.
02/13/2008 - Coordinated disclosure
------------------------------------------
Regards,
Ruben.
www.reversemode.com
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