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Message-ID: <0273B67044957C41BD71D12EBA2E00AE252F5E@becca.LarrySeltzer.local>
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2008 23:36:33 -0400
From: "Larry Seltzer" <Larry@...ryseltzer.com>
To: "Jacob Appelbaum" <jacob@...elbaum.net>
Cc: "Tim" <tim-security@...tinelchicken.org>,
<full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>, <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: RE: [Full-disclosure] Firewire Attack on Windows Vista
>>You're mistaken in thinking that we're conflating sleep and hibernate
modes.
>>Microsoft's response of using two factor authentication is silly. It
doesn't actually stop our attacks. In certain circumstances, it may
shorten the window of attack for a specific type of user but it's mostly
irrelevant. Consider a mail server with an encrypted drive, no proximity
sensor or two factor authentication is going to help you. A seizure will
still result in someone getting the keys that are in memory
- unless you're using some sort of secure crypto co-processor (which no
one is).
>From your own paper:
> Microsoft ... recommends configuring BitLocker in "advanced
> mode," where it protects the disk key using the TPM along with a
password or a key on a removable
> USB device. However, even with these measures, BitLocker is vulnerable
if an attacker gets to the system
> while the screen is locked or the computer is asleep (though not if it
is hibernating or powered off).
So in other words, hibernate does make a difference, especially if you
follow their guidelines.
Larry Seltzer
eWEEK.com Security Center Editor
http://security.eweek.com/
http://blogs.pcmag.com/securitywatch/
Contributing Editor, PC Magazine
larry.seltzer@...fdavisenterprise.com
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