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Message-ID: <4819E0DE.1070304@idefense.com>
Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 11:25:18 -0400
From: iDefense Labs <labs-no-reply@...fense.com>
To: vulnwatch@...nwatch.org, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk,
	bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 04.30.08: Akamai Download Manager Arbitrary
 Program Execution Vulnerability

iDefense Security Advisory 04.30.08
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Apr 30, 2008

I. BACKGROUND

Akamai Download Manager is an integral component of Akamai's global
distribution service. It is used to deliver big files quickly and
reliably to users around world. It has been used by vendors such as
Symantec and Microsoft to provide downloads to the public.

Akamai provides both an ActiveX and a Java based Download Manager. If a
user uses the ActiveX control once, it will remain installed on the
users computer until manually removed. For more information, please
visit following web sites.

http://www.akamai.com/html/technology/products/http_downloads.html

http://www.akamai.com/html/solutions/electronic_software_delivery.html

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of a design error in Akamai Technologies, Inc's
Download Manager allows attackers to execute arbitrary code in the
context of the current user.

The ActiveX control version has the following identifiers:

  Class: DownloadManager Control
  CLSID: 2AF5BD25-90C5-4EEC-88C5-B44DC2905D8B
  CLSID: FFBB3F3B-0A5A-4106-BE53-DFE1E2340CB1
  ProgId: MANAGER.DLMCtrl.1.
  File: C:\Windows\Downloaded Program Files\DownloadManagerV2.ocx

The Java version has the following identifiers:

  Class: com.akamai.dm.ui.applet.DMApplet.class
  JAR: dlm-java-2.2.2.0.jar

This problem specifically exists due to two undocumented object
parameters. By using these parameters, it is possible to cause Download
Manager to automatically download and execute arbitrary binaries from
attacker controlled locations.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context
of the user viewing a maliciously crafted web page.

In order to exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need to
persuade, or otherwise force, a user to view a malicious web page. This
is usually accomplished by getting the targeted user to click a link in
a form of electronic communication such as e-mail or instant messaging.

While the attack is happening, the Download Manager user interface is
displayed. However, in a normal attack scenario there is insufficient
time to cancel the download before exploitation occurs.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense confirmed the existence of this vulnerability using version
2.2.2.1 of Akamai Technologies Inc's DownloadManagerV2.ocx.
Additionally, iDefense confirmed the problem exists in version 2.2.2.0
of the Download Manager Java Applet. All versions prior to the fixed
version are suspected to be vulnerable.

V. WORKAROUND

Setting kill-bits for the associated CLSIDs will prevent the ActiveX
control from being loaded within Internet Explorer, thereby preventing
exploitation.

Disabling Java will prevent exploitation using the Java Applet version.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

Akamai has addressed this vulnerability with the release of version
2.2.3.5 of their Download Manager product. For more information, refer
to their advisory. To download the updated version, visit the following
URL.

http://dlm.tools.akamai.com/tools/upgrade.html

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2008-6339 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

12/06/2007  Initial vendor notification
12/06/2007  Initial vendor response
04/30/2008  Public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by Peter Vreugdenhil.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php

Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2008 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail customerservice@...fense.com for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
 There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.

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