Message-ID: <494BBC7A.8070700@retis.it>
Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2008 16:23:38 +0100
From: Mobile Security Lab <mseclab@...is.it>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: HTC Touch vCard over IP Denial of Service 

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Security Advisory

MSL-2008-002 - HTC Touch vCard over IP Denial of Service



Advisory Information
- --------------------
Title:			
HTC Touch vCard over IP Denial of Service

Advisory ID:		
MSL-2008-002

Advisory URL:
http://www.mseclab.com/index.php?page_id=110

Published:
2008-12-19

Updated:
2008-12-19

Vendor:
HTC

Platforms:
Touch Pro, Touch Cruise


Vulnerability Details
- ---------------------
Class:
Denial of Service

Remote:
Yes

Local:
No

Public References:
Not Assigned

Affected:
HTC Touch Pro, HTC Touch Cruiser

Not Affected:
Currently Unknown

Description:
UDP/9204 port is open and reachable both via WiFi and GPRS/UMTS
connection when the device is capable of sending and receiving SMS.
Port is always open on the Touch Pro, while on Touch Cruiser the port is
open when the SMS application is running.

UDP/9204 is associated with the service WAP-vCard and is used for
sending vCard files to the device, that are displayed as normal SMS to
users.
By flooding the device with multiple vCards it is possible to perform a
Denial of Service attack that  affects usability, SMS handling and
connectivity.
By sending large number of vCards an attacker can achieve significant
device slowdown, making  the UI sluggish and hard to use.
In some cases WiFi connections may be dropped (when vCards are sent via
WiFi), effectively disconnecting the device from the network.

On Touch Cruiser devices, SMS inbox can be completely filled by sending
more then 450 large vCards (size 32K).
The device will not be able to receive SMS anymore or to access the
message stored inside the device until SMS deletion occurs.
Additionally, when large vCards are sent, no acoustic notification (ring
tones) will be played upon incoming messages,  making the attack more
silent and less noticeable by an user.

Battery removal may be needed, in some cases, for restoring normal
functionalities.
Manual deletion of all received SMS requires a very long time, making
the deletion of all the SMS the most viable option, but leading to loss
of all received SMS and requiring in any case a large amount of time
(even hours).
The faster option for restoring the device is performing a hard reset of
the device, leading to the loss of all the content saved on the handset.

The attack can be easily carried in all the scenarios where the device
IP stack is accessible to an attacker, such as Wireless LANs and Mobile
Networks assigning public IP addresses without any firewall protection.
Solutions & Workaround:
A personal firewall solution can be used for denying unwanted access to
the port, effectively avoiding possible attacks.


Additional Information
- ----------------------

Timeline:
2008-12-03:	Issue discovery
2008-12-05:	Initial Vendor Notification: Point of Contact requested via
contact form on website (No suitable e-mail available)
2008-12-14:	Vendor Response: Customer support answered without providing
any suitable contact for vulnerability communication
2008-12-19:	Public Disclosure

Vendor Statement:
None

- --

Mobile Security Lab

Website: www.mseclab.com <http://www.mseclab.com>

GPG Key Fingerprint
3CEC 8BFA 90C0 E620 B48C 2645 9C8C 642D A501 073F

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