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Message-ID: <49F75EB5.8030109@idefense.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2009 15:53:25 -0400
From: iDefense Labs <labs-no-reply@...fense.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, vulnwatch@...nwatch.org,
full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 04.28.09: TIBCO SmartSockets Stack Buffer
Overflow Vulnerability
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iDefense Security Advisory 04.28.09
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Apr 28, 2009
I. BACKGROUND
SmartSockets is a message-passing framework used to transport messages
over disparate channels. The RTserver is the server component of the
framework. For more information, see the vendor's site found at the
following link.
http://www.tibco.com/software/messaging/smartsockets/default.jsp
II. DESCRIPTION
Remote exploitation of a stack based buffer overflow vulnerability in
TIBCO Software Inc.'s SmartSockets RTserver could allow an attacker to
execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the affected service.
The vulnerability occurs when parsing requests on the UDP interface of
the RTserver.
III. ANALYSIS
Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code with the privileges of the affected service, usually SYSTEM. No
authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability. Since the
vulnerability is a stack based buffer overflow, and there are no stack
cookies, reliable exploitation is trivial.
IV. DETECTION
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in the
RTserver version 4.0.10.1. Previous versions may also be affected.
The SmartSockets framework is resold to various 3rd party vendors, and
in this case iDefense used the version provided with Computer
Associates Enterprise Communicator.
V. WORKAROUND
TIBCO has identified the following workarounds:
* Disable the rtserver UDP port if it has been enabled in the rtserver
configuration file.
* Utilize a firewall to restrict access to the rtserver.
* Use a user with restricted privileges to invoke the rtserver
or application.
* On Unix systems, invoke the server or application from a chroot
environment. This will restrict the ability to access or
modify information in the event of a successful exploit.
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
TIBCO has released a patch which addresses this issue. For more
information, consult their advisory at the following URL:
http://www.tibco.com/services/support/advisories/default.jsp
VII. CVE INFORMATION
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2009-1291 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
03/18/2009 - Initial Contact
03/18/2009 - PoC Requested
03/25/2009 - PoC Sent
03/30/2009 - Vendor PoC ACK
04/07/2009 - Vendor Validated
04/10/2009 - Coordination
04/14/2009 - CVE from Vendor
04/14/2009 - Coordination
04/28/2009 - Coordinated Public Disclosure
IX. CREDIT
This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by Stephen Fewer of Harmony
Security (www.harmonysecurity.com)
Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php
Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/
X. LEGAL NOTICES
Copyright © 2009 iDefense, Inc.
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail customerservice@...fense.com for permission.
Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.
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