bugtraq - iDefense Security Advisory 05.12.09: Microsoft PowerPoint Notes Container Heap Corruption Vulnerability

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Message-ID: <4A0A0005.2080308@idefense.com>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 19:02:29 -0400
From: iDefense Labs <labs-no-reply@...fense.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, vulnwatch@...nwatch.org,
	full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 05.12.09: Microsoft PowerPoint Notes Container
 Heap Corruption Vulnerability

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iDefense Security Advisory 05.12.09
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
May 12, 2009

I. BACKGROUND

Microsoft PowerPoint is an application used for constructing
presentations, and comes with the Microsoft Office suite. For more
information, see the vendor's site found at the following link.

http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/powerpoint/default.aspx

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of a heap corruption vulnerability in Microsoft
Corp.'s PowerPoint could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code
with the privileges of the current user.

The vulnerability occurs when parsing the Notes container inside of the
PowerPoint Document stream. This container is used to hold records
related to notes that appear on the slides. By inserting a value into a
container, it is possible to trigger a memory corruption vulnerability.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code with the privileges of the user opening the file. To exploit this
vulnerability, an attacker needs to convince a user to open a malicious
file. If the targeted user is running PowerPoint 2000, and the "Office
Document Open Confirmation Tool" is not installed, then it is possible
to exploit this vulnerability directly through the browser.

Due to the nature of the vulnerability, relatively precise control of
the process memory layout is needed to successfully exploit this
vulnerability. iDefense Labs has developed exploit code that
successfully exploits this vulnerability.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in the
following versions of PowerPoint:

PowerPoint 2000 SP3

PowerPoint 2002 (XP) SP3

PowerPoint 2003 SP2

PowerPoint 2003 SP3

PowerPoint 2007, PowerPoint 2007 SP1, and PowerPoint Viewer 2003 are not
affected.

V. WORKAROUND

Since PowerPoint Viewer 2003 is not affected, using it to view untrusted
or unexpected PowerPoint files is a valid workaround.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

Microsoft has released a patch which addresses this issue. For more
information, consult their advisory at the following URL:

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS09-017.mspx

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2009-1130 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

10/22/2008  - Initial Contact
10/22/2008  - Initial Vendor Response
10/22/2008  - PoC Requested
11/05/2008  - PoC Sent
11/05/2008  - Vendor Case Number Assigned
11/07/2008  - Vendor Status Update
02/19/2009  - Vendor Status Update
05/12/2009  - Coordinated Public Disclosure

IX. CREDIT

This vulnerability was discovered by Sean Larsson, iDefense Labs.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php

Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2009 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail customerservice@...fense.com for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
 There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.
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