bugtraq - Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on Linux

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Message-ID: <20091024190249.GB18634@elf.ucw.cz>
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2009 21:02:50 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: psz@...hs.usyd.edu.au
Cc: dan@...htwave.net.ru, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on
 Linux

On Sat 2009-10-24 10:47:38, psz@...hs.usyd.edu.au wrote:
> Dear Pavel,
> 
> > ... can you see a way to write to that file when /proc is unmounted?
> 
> While there is legitimate access to do so (after file is created and
> before pavel issues 'chmod 700 /tmp/my_priv'), guest to use commands:
> 
>   ln /tmp/my_priv/unwritable_file /tmp/hardlink-to-object
> 
> and then use that instead of /proc/self/fd/3, should work same as
> original "attack" (and am curious whether 'link counts' shown by
> 'ls -l /tmp/my_priv/unwritable_file' are 1 or 2 in each case).

You are welcome to try it. link count is 2 for "ln" case and 1 for
"/proc" case -- and that's exactly the problem. "pavel" has no chance
to know that backdoor exists.
									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html