lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2009 09:14:30 -0600
From: nomail@...ail.com
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions
 on Linux

>> I do not think mounting /proc should change access control semantics.
>>
>It didn't in fact change anything. If the guest created hardlink to that file in a unrestricted location, what would you say?

Do your homework and test it. You can't create the hardlink - the link(oldpath, newpath) call will fail with EACCES if search permission is denied for any directory in oldpath or newpath. Documented in the manpage, and I just tested and verified it.

Fact is, directory permissions are relevant in Unix. Despite it's permissions, under the Unix access permission semantics the file is unwriteable for anyone but the owner, and this bug pokes a hole into that.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ