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Message-ID: <20091030174028.GA5359@psychosis.jim.sh>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 13:40:28 -0400
From: Jim Paris <jim@...n.com>
To: Marco Verschuur <marco@....nl>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Dan Yefimov <dan@...htwave.net.ru>,
bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on
Linux
Marco Verschuur wrote:
> Your assumption that the same file descriptor is being re-opened is
> wrong! The file descriptor retrieved via /proc is a new one. It is
> not the same as the initial read-only.
Yes, I totally agree.
> Therefor it's totally of no influence what you do with the original
> directory permission. File access has nothing to do with directory
> permissions...!
Right. However the whole point of this discussion is that that is a
non-obvious point, there was no other way that the user could have
opened that file without the use of /proc.
> Imagen:
> - a house surrounded with a fence with all doors unlocked (file with
> perm 0666)
> - a drive-way leads to the gate in the fence and the gate is unlocked
> (dir with perms 777)
> - next we put a lock on the gate and don't give guest the key (dir with
> perms 700)
> - guest cannot access the house because he can't pass the gate
> - now we take an airplane and parachute guest straight into the
> perimeter of the fence (/proc access)
> - guest can access the house (write the file), because the house has all
> doors unlocked
Pavel required that the superuser have lax directory permisisons and
subsequently make them more restrictive, which led to a flurry of
responses about hardlinks, race conditions, etc. My example merely
removed this aspect to demonstrate that it is not a race. In mine,
the directory permissions are 0700 from the start and there are no
races involved.
-jim
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