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Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2010 14:51:59 -0800
From: "Arian J. Evans" <>
To: James Landis <>,
	"Timothy D. Morgan" <>,,,
Subject: Re: [Webappsec] Paper: Weaning the Web off of Session Cookies

Good points James. I read this paper a few times to make sure I got
the point, and it's a cute idea but I just don't see it happening.

For multi-node, multi-app, websites sharing auth/state/preferences
across multiple web assets (physical servers and logical "websites")
this is pretty much a non-starter. Cookies rule here. For a dozen
different reasons that I can think of.

Always good to try and raise the bar, but the world has voted cookies
(thanks Lou!) and I think they are here to stay for at least the next

Oh, yeah, and marketing rules the world, and web sales and marketing
(and Google) LOVE cookies. So that is what it is and I really don't
see that changing until they can inject a tracking device into your

Arian Evans
capitalist marksman. eats animals.

On Thu, Jan 28, 2010 at 2:03 PM, James Landis <> wrote:
> Tim,
> Great writeup of the state of the union for Web-based authentication methods.
> As you mention, your paper is primarily an argument for fixing HTTP
> auth. That might make a better title for it, in fact, since that does
> seem to be the primary thrust of the arguments presented. Or at least,
> "If We Wean the Web Off of Session Cookies, This Is Some of What We'd
> Have to do". I wasn't convinced at all that Weaning the Web Off of
> Session Cookies was the logical conclusion of the data you presented.
> To solve problems with forms-based auth + session tokens, we only have
> to fix some things in Web app frameworks, many of which have already
> been fixed in major platforms. Predictable session identifiers, for
> instance, pretty much died out years ago. To migrate to HTTP Digest
> Auth, not only would we have to fix a few things in Web app
> frameworks, we'd have to refactor a massive amount of custom code AND
> convince all major browser vendors all to do the same right things and
> THEN force everyone to update their UA to the latest version.
> I'm not sure you've identified the path of least resistance! :)
> -j
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2010 at 11:05 AM, Timothy D. Morgan
> <> wrote:
>> Hello,
>> I've just posted a new paper some of you may be interested in:
>> While it's primarily an argument for fixing HTTP authentication, it
>> does contain information on a few weaknesses common in browsers,
>> including password manager issues and user interface vulnerabilities.
>> Feedback is more than welcome.
>> Enjoy,
>> tim
>> Abstract
>> ========
>> In this paper, we compare the security weaknesses and usability
>> limitations of both cookie-based session management and HTTP digest
>> authentication; demonstrating how digest authentication is clearly the
>> more secure system in practice.  We propose several small changes in
>> browser behavior and HTTP standards that will make HTTP authentication
>> schemes, such as digest authentication, a viable option in future
>> application development.
>> _______________________________________________
>> Webappsec mailing list
> _______________________________________________
> Webappsec mailing list

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