lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <1266965946.2441.8117.camel@new-desktop>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2010 23:59:06 +0100
From: Nicob <nicob@...ob.net>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Kojoney (SSH honeypot) remote DoS


[=] Affected software : 

        Name : Kojoney
	Description : Low interaction SSH honeypot
	Version : < 0.0.4.2
        Service : TCP/22

[=] Patched version : 

http://sourceforge.net/projects/kojoney/files/kojoney-0.0.4.2.tar.gz/download

[=] Technical details : 

Emulation of the wget and curl commands is made via calls to
urllib.urlopen(url). The only sanity check is the following :

	if url.find("://") == -1:
		url = "http://" + url

This will catch some attempts to access local files like
"file:/etc/hosts" but requesting "file://localhost/foo/bar" is still
possible.

Under Linux, this can be used to access "file://localhost/dev/urandom".
The kojoney.py process will then use 100% of CPU and will grow in
memory, until killed by the kernel OOM Killer.

[=] Note :

When exploiting urlopen() related vulnerabilities in Python
applications, some little known features can come handy :

data://,HelloWorld
=> returned value is "HelloWorld"

data:text;base64,WDVPIVAlQEFQWzRcUFpYNTQoUF4pN0NDKTd9JEVJQ0FSLVNUQU5EQVJELUFOVElWSVJVUy1URVNULUZJTEUhJEgrSCo=://a
=> returned value is the EICAR test string

And yes, these strings too bypass the "://" Kojoney check ;-)

Nicob 

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ