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Message-ID: <4BE9B6A3.3040407@coresecurity.com>
Date: Tue, 11 May 2010 16:57:23 -0300
From: Core Security Technologies Advisories Team <advisories@...esecurity.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: [CORE-2010-0405] Adobe Director Invalid Read
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Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/
Adobe Director DIRAPI.DLL Invalid Read Vulnerability
1. *Advisory Information*
Title: Adobe Director DIRAPI.DLL Invalid Read Vulnerability
Advisory Id: CORE-2010-0405
Advisory URL:
[http://www.coresecurity.com/content/adobe-director-invalid-read]
Date published: 2010-05-11
Date of last update: 2010-05-11
Vendors contacted: Adobe
Release mode: Coordinated release
2. *Vulnerability Information*
Class: Input validation error [CWE-20]
Impact: Denial of service
Remotely Exploitable: Yes (client-side)
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2010-0128
Bugtraq ID: N/A
3. *Vulnerability Description*
Adobe Director is prone to a vulnerability due to an invalid read in
'DIRAPI.DLL', when opening a malformed .dir file. This vulnerability
could be used by a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code, by
enticing the user of Adobe Director to open a specially crafted file.
4. *Vulnerable packages*
. Adobe Director 11.5
. Adobe Director 11 (Version: 11.0.0.426)
5. *Non-vulnerable packages*
. Adobe Director 11.5 (Version: 11.5.7.609)
6. *Solutions and Workarounds*
See the Adobe Security Bulletin [1] available at
[http://www.adobe.com/go/apsb10-12/].
7. *Credits*
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Nahuel Riva, from
Core Security Technologies. Publication was coordinated by Jorge
Lucangeli Obes.
8. *Technical Description*
The vulnerability occurs at offset '0x68174813' of the 'dirapi.dll'
module of Adobe Director. Improper validation of input data leads to a
crash in the memory read instruction. This vulnerability could result in
arbitrary code execution, although it was not verified.
/-----
App: Adobe Director 11
Version: 11.0.0.426
Module crash: Dirapi.dll Version: 11.0.0.426
Crash:
68174813 |. 8906 |MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI],EAX
68174815 |> 8B4C24 14 |MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+14]
68174819 |. 51 |PUSH ECX
6817481A |. E8 3197F5FF |CALL <JMP.&IML32.#1414>
6817481F |. 8946 04 |MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4],EAX
68174822 |. 83C6 08 |ADD ESI,8
68174825 |. 4D |DEC EBP
68174826 |.^ 75 C8 \JNZ SHORT DIRAPI.681747F0
EAX=00000000
DS:[02889B20]=???
Registers:
EAX 00000000
ECX 00000068
EDX 00000001
EBX FFE4B4D4
ESP 0012DFB8
EBP 0000373D
ESI 02889B20
EDI 01BC9964
EIP 68174813 DIRAPI.68174813
C 0 ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
P 1 CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
Z 1 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
S 0 FS 003B 32bit 7FFDD000(FFF)
T 0 GS 0000 NULL
D 0
O 0 LastErr ERROR_NEGATIVE_SEEK (00000083)
EFL 00250246 (NO,NB,E,BE,NS,PE,GE,LE)
ST0 empty -??? FFFF 00000000 00000000
ST1 empty -??? FFFF 00000000 00000000
ST2 empty -??? FFFF 00000000 00000000
ST3 empty -??? FFFF 00000000 00000000
ST4 empty 0.0000106994366433355
ST5 empty 0.6322773098945617676
ST6 empty -0.0034003453329205513
ST7 empty 1041416.9375000000000
3 2 1 0 E S P U O Z D I
FST 4220 Cond 1 0 1 0 Err 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 (EQ)
FCW 007F Prec NEAR,24 Mask 1 1 1 1 1 1
Stack Trace:
Call stack of main thread
Address Stack Procedure / arguments Called from
Frame
0012DFC4 68175563 DIRAPI.681747A0 DIRAPI.6817555E
0012DFE4 6817003B DIRAPI.68175290 DIRAPI.68170036
0012E018 6817020D DIRAPI.6816FF40 DIRAPI.68170208
0012E01C 00A923C8 Arg1 = 00A923C8
0012E020 00000011 Arg2 = 00000011
0012E024 00000003 Arg3 = 00000003
0012E028 0012E050 Arg4 = 0012E050
0012E02C 00001100 Arg5 = 00001100
0012E048 680F6D50 DIRAPI.681701A0 DIRAPI.680F6D4B
0012E04C 00000000 Arg1 = 00000000
0012E050 00000003 Arg2 = 00000003
0012E054 00000091 Arg3 = 00000091
0012E058 0012E07C Arg4 = 0012E07C
0012E05C 00001100 Arg5 = 00001100
0012E068 6800CFC0 DIRAPI.680F6D30 DIRAPI.6800CFBB
0012E088 680817EC DIRAPI.6800CF80 DIRAPI.680817E7
0012E0B4 680823E3 DIRAPI.68081760 DIRAPI.680823DE
0012E0C8 680836A7 DIRAPI.68082380 DIRAPI.680836A2
0012E638 680839E2 DIRAPI.68082EA0 DIRAPI.680839DD
0012E634
0012E63C 00A86E8C Arg1 = 00A86E8C
0012E640 0012F5EC Arg2 = 0012F5EC
0012E644 00000000 Arg3 = 00000000
0012E648 00000000 Arg4 = 00000000
0012E64C 0000001A Arg5 = 0000001A
0012E674 68042D8C DIRAPI.68083970 DIRAPI.68042D87
0012F5EC
0012E678 00A86E8C Arg1 = 00A86E8C
0012E67C 0012F5EC Arg2 = 0012F5EC
0012E680 00000000 Arg3 = 00000000
0012E684 00000000 Arg4 = 00000000
0012E688 0000001A Arg5 = 0000001A
0012E6B0 6800A111 DIRAPI.68042C90 DIRAPI.#88+7C
0012E6B4 00A92588 Arg1 = 00A92588
0012E6B8 0012F5EC Arg2 = 0012F5EC
0012E6BC 00000000 Arg3 = 00000000
0012E6C0 0000001A Arg4 = 0000001A
0012E6DC 2018BB23 <JMP.&DIRAPI.#88> Director.2018BB1E
0012E83C 2027E776 ? Director.2018BAB0 Director.2027E771
- -----/
9. *Report Timeline*
. 2010-04-14:
Vendor contacted.
. 2010-04-14:
Vendor requests PoC file.
. 2010-04-14:
Core replies with the PoC file and the draft advisory.
. 2010-04-14:
Adobe replies that will investigate the issue and sets a preliminary
release date for June/July.
. 2010-04-15:
Core agrees with the preliminary release date.
. 2010-04-28:
Core requests an update on the situation, and asks whether Adobe was
able to confirm if the bug is exploitable.
. 2010-04-28:
Adobe replies that the issue was investigated and is scheduled to be
fixed in the next release of Adobe Shockwave Player, planned for May;
they did not carry out further exploitability research.
. 2010-04-28:
Core requests a specific publication date for the fix.
. 2010-05-06:
Adobe informs Core that the release date for the fix has been set to May
11th.
. 2010-05-07:
Core asks Adobe if they want to provide the text for the "Solutions and
Workarounds" section of the advisory.
. 2010-05-07:
Adobe replies with the text for the "Solutions and Workarounds" section
of the advisory.
. 2010-05-11:
Advisory published.
10. *References*
[1] Adobe Security Bulletin [http://www.adobe.com/go/apsb10-12/].
11. *About CoreLabs*
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:
[http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs].
12. *About Core Security Technologies*
Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help
security-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a
proactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship
product, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing
enterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,
endpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are
exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security
investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security
Technologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class
security consulting services, including penetration testing and software
security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core
Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at
[http://www.coresecurity.com].
13. *Disclaimer*
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2010 Core Security
Technologies and (c) 2010 CoreLabs, and may be distributed freely
provided that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit
is given.
14. *PGP/GPG Keys*
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at
[http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc].
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