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Message-ID: <4C057125.60008@coresecurity.com>
Date: Tue, 01 Jun 2010 17:44:21 -0300
From: Mailing lists at Core Security Technologies <lists@...esecurity.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Nginx 0.8.35 Space Character Remote Source Disclosure

info@...uritylab.ir wrote:
> Vul in stable versions now isn't work.
> Original Advisory:
> http://blog.pouya.info/userfiles/vul/NginX.rar

http://www.coresecurity.com/content/filename-pseudonyms-vulnerabilities

Multiple Vulnerabilities with 8.3 filename pseudonyms in Web servers

"Nginx Web Server [1]. The way Nginx handles files may differ when they
are requested using their 8.3 alias, and short file or path names are
not correctly handled when applying file handling rules or access
restrictions. By abusing of these flaws an attacker can bypass security
options implemented in the web server. For instance, file.shtml will
become FILE~1.SHT. This will cause the file to be handled as a .sht
file, not a .shtml file. The result of this is that instead of
processing SSI directives as would normally be the case with a .shtml
file, the file would be served unprocessed. Additionally, Nginx does not
correctly handle extraneous spaces after file extensions when applying
preprocessing rules or access restrictions."

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