bugtraq - nSense-2010-002: Teamspeak 2 Windows client

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Message-ID: <AANLkTi=6drg+KRmKT7T9xUn=fXGCn4SFsyKUAxrKgQUi@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 2010 09:36:34 +0300
From: Henri Lindberg <henri+lists@...nse.fi>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: nSense-2010-002: Teamspeak 2 Windows client

       nSense Vulnerability Research Security Advisory NSENSE-2010-002
       ---------------------------------------------------------------
                   t2'10 infosec conference special release
                               http://www.t2.fi
       ---------------------------------------------------------------

       Affected Vendor:    Teamspeak Systems GmbH
       Affected Product:   Teamspeak 2 version 2.0.32.60
       Platform:           Windows
       Impact:             Remote code execution
       Vendor response:    No patch. Upgrade to TS3
       Credit:             Jokaim / nSense

       Technical details
       ---------------------------------------------------------------

       The specific flaw exists within the TeamSpeak.exe module
       teardown procedure responsible for freeing dynamically
       allocated application handles.

       It is possible to corrupt this memory area by transmitting a
       voice transmission packet (0xf2) to the server. All clients
       receiving the voice transmission will have their memory
       corrupted. The resulting memory corruption leads to a overflow
       of values which are later used in a copy operation
       (during teardown).

       This can be leveraged to achieve remote code execution
       within the context of the user running the application.

       The following packet is provided as a Proof-of-Concept example:
       f2be000426ad7e00300000000001000a414141414141414141424141414141
       4141414141414141414141414141414141414100ff99414141424242424141
       414141414141414141

       Bytes 51 and onwards contain user controllable values for EAX
       and EDX. A weaponized exploit has been developed but will not
       be released to the public. See memory location 00401C72.

       Timeline:
       Jul 20th        Contacted CERT-FI vulncoord
       Jul 22nd        CERT-FI vulcoord responds,coordination started
       Aug 9th         Status update request sent to CERT-FI
       Aug 20th        CERT-FI informs that the vendor had suggested
                       posting the issue to their plic support
                       forum. Coordination continued.
       Aug 26th        Status update request sent to CERT-FI
       Aug 26th        CERT-FI responds
       Sep 23rd        Weaponized exploit ready and polished.
                       Information sent to CERT-FI
       Sep 28th        CERT-FI informs that vendor is not supporting
                       TS2, since 's a legacy version. Users are
                       instructed to upgrade to TS3.
       Oct 28th        Advisory published.

       A thank you to CERT-FI vulncoord for the coordination effort.


       http://www.nsense.fi                       http://www.nsense.dk



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