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Message-id: <201106011100.cnr@psirt.cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2011 11:30:00 -0400
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@...co.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Cc: psirt@...co.com
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Default Credentials Vulnerability in Cisco Network Registrar
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Cisco Security Advisory: Default Credentials Vulnerability in Cisco
Network Registrar
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20110601-cnr
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2011 June 01 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco Network Registrar Software Releases prior to 7.2 contain a
default password for the administrative account. During the initial
installation, users are not forced to change this password, allowing
it to persist after the installation. An attacker who is aware of
this vulnerability could authenticate with administrative privileges
and arbitrarily change the configuration of Cisco Network Registrar.
The upgrade to Software Release 7.2 is not free; however, a
workaround is provided in this document that will prevent
exploitation of the vulnerability.
When performing an upgrade to Software Release 7.2, you must use the
workaround to change the password of the administrative account. You
will be prompted to enter a new administrator's password only if you
are performing a new installation of Software Release 7.2 of Cisco
Network Registrar.
The workaround for this vulnerability is to change the password
associated with the administrative account using the method described
in the "Workarounds" section.
This advisory is posted at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110601-cnr.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
This vulnerability affects all releases of Cisco Network Registrar
prior to Software Release 7.2. The vulnerability is present in the
affected releases on all platforms.
To verify the release of Cisco Network Registrar that is running,
select the About option from the menu. Alternatively, if using the
command-line interface, execute the following command:
nrcmd> session get version
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
Details
=======
Cisco Network Registrar provides highly scalable and reliable DNS,
DHCP, and TFTP services. The central management capabilities of Cisco
Network Registrar simplify administrative tasks associated with
network and device configuration.
Cisco Network Registrar contains a default password for the
administrative account. An attacker could use this knowledge to
authenticate with administrative privileges and arbitrarily change
the configuration of Cisco Network Registrar. This vulnerability is
documented in Cisco bug ID CSCsm50627 ( registered customers only)
and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
identifier CVE-2011-2024.
Additionally, it is a good practice to change passwords periodically.
The interval should comply with an organization's security policy
but, as a guideline, passwords should be changed two to three times a
year. This practice applies equally to all products regardless of
when they are installed and to all users, administrators and
non-administrators.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
* CSCsm50627 - Initially supplied admin password not changed during the installation
CVSS Base Score - 10
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may allow an attacker to
make arbitrary changes to the configuration of Cisco Network
Registrar.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
This vulnerability is fixed in Software Release 7.2. All releases of
Cisco Network Registrar prior to 7.2 will not force users to change
the administrative password during the initial installation.
Workarounds
===========
The provided workaround changes the password that is associated with
the administrator's account. To change the password using the web
interface, select Advanced -> Administrators -> Admin from the menu.
Execute the following command to change the administrator's password
using the command-line interface:
admin <admin-name> enterPassword
Additionally, access to Cisco Network Registrar (TCP ports 8080,
8090, 8443, and 8453) and the host on which it is running should be
limited to legitimate IP addresses. Consult the documentation of the
host operating system for further details how to accomplish this
task.
The use of IP addresses as a form of authentication is a
well-established network security practice. For more guidance on the
use of access control lists (ACLs) or the explicit identification of
network management stations in devices and applications, reference
the white paper A Security-Oriented Approach to IP Addressing at the
following link:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/security-for-ip-addr.html
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco will not make free upgrade software available for affected
customers to address this vulnerability. The workaround provided in
this document describes how to change the passwords in current
releases of the software.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at:
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@...co.com or security-alert@...co.com for
software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@...co.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice.
Refer to:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for
additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers,
and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered during an internal review.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110601-cnr.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@...co.com
* first-bulletins@...ts.first.org
* bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
* cisco@...t.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
* full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2001-06-01 | public |
| | | release |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices.
All Cisco security advisories are available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
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Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
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