bugtraq - [SECURITY] CVE-2011-2526 Apache Tomcat Information disclosure and availability vulnerabilities

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Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2011 16:33:22 +0100
From: Mark Thomas <markt@...che.org>
To: Tomcat Users List <users@...cat.apache.org>
Cc: Tomcat Announce List <announce@...cat.apache.org>, 
 announce@...che.org, Tomcat Developers List <dev@...cat.apache.org>, 
 Tomcat Security List <security@...cat.apache.org>,
 full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [SECURITY] CVE-2011-2526 Apache Tomcat Information disclosure and
 availability vulnerabilities


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CVE-2011-2526: Apache Tomcat Information disclosure and availability
               vulnerabilities

Severity: low

Vendor:
The Apache Software Foundation

Versions Affected:
Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.18
Tomcat 6.0.0 to 6.0.32
Tomcat 5.5.0 to 5.0.33
Previous, unsupported versions may be affected
Additionally, these vulnerabilities only occur when all of the following
are true:
a) untrusted web applications are being used
b) the SecurityManager is used to limit the untrusted web applications
c) the HTTP NIO or HTTP APR connector is used
d) sendfile is enabled for the connector (this is the default)

Description:
Tomcat provides support for sendfile with the HTTP NIO and HTTP APR
connectors. sendfile is used automatically for content served via the
DefaultServlet and deployed web applications may use it directly via
setting request attributes. These request attributes were not validated.
When running under a security manager, this lack of validation allowed a
malicious web application to do one or more of the following that would
normally be prevented by a security manager:
a) return files to users that the security manager should make inaccessible
b) terminate (via a crash) the JVM

Mitigation:
Affected users of all versions can mitigate these vulnerabilities by
taking any of the following actions:
a) undeploy untrusted web applications
b) switch to the HTTP BIO connector (which does not support sendfile)
c) disable sendfile be setting useSendfile="false" on the connector
d) apply the patch(es) listed on the Tomcat security pages (see references)
e) upgrade to a version where the vulnerabilities have been fixed
   Tomcat 7.0.x users may upgrade to 7.0.19 or later once released
   Tomcat 6.0.x users may upgrade to 6.0.33 or later once released
   Tomcat 5.5.x users may upgrade to 5.5.34 or later once released

Example:
Exposing the first 1000 bytes of /etc/passwd
HttpServletRequest.setAttribute(
        "org.apache.tomcat.sendfile.filename","/etc/passwd");
HttpServletRequest.setAttribute(
        "org.apache.tomcat.sendfile.start",Long.valueOf(0));
HttpServletRequest.setAttribute(
        "org.apache.tomcat.sendfile.end",Long.valueOf(1000));
Specifying a end point after the end of the file will trigger a JVM
crash with the HTTP APR connector and an infinite loop with the HTTP NIO
connector.

Credit:
These issues were identified by the Tomcat security team.

References:
http://tomcat.apache.org/security.html
http://tomcat.apache.org/security-7.html
http://tomcat.apache.org/security-6.html
http://tomcat.apache.org/security-5.html

The Apache Tomcat Security Team

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