lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <201203281800.q2SI013g018696@sf01web2.securityfocus.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 18:00:01 GMT
From: nospam@...il.it
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Quest InTrust 10.4.x ReportTree and SimpleTree Classes ArDoc.dll
 ActiveX Control Remote File Creation / Overwrite Vulnerability

Quest InTrust 10.4.x ReportTree and SimpleTree Classes ArDoc.dll ActiveX Control Remote File Creation / Overwrite

homepage: http://www.quest.com/intrust/

description: "InTrust securely collects, stores, reports and 
alerts on event log data from Windows, Unix and Linux systems, 
helping you comply with external regulations, internal policies 
and security best practices."


download url of a test version:
http://www.quest.com/downloads/

file tested: Quest_InTrust---Full-Package_104.zip

Background:

The mentioned product, when installed, registers two classes
with the following settings:

binary path: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Aelita Shared\ARDoc.dll
CLSID: {C6FAAD6A-68AE-452B-9F7A-9293408F51EF}
ProgID: ARDOC.ReportTree.1
Implements IObjectSafety: yes
Safe For Scripting (IObjectSafety): True
Safe For Initialization (IObjectSafety): ?

binary path: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Aelita Shared\ARDoc.dll
CLSID: {EB5920E8-F6FA-4080-ADDC-AA03FA23E2AB}
ProgID: ARDOC.SimpleTree.1
Implements IObjectSafety: yes
Safe For Scripting (IObjectSafety): True
Safe For Initialization (IObjectSafety): ?

According to IObjectSafety interface, this control is safe
for scripting then Internet Explorer will allow scripting
of this control.

Vulnerability:
both classes expose insecure methods (read/write):


..
/* DISPID=34 */
/* VT_BOOL [11] */
function LoadFromFile(
        /* VT_BSTR [8]  */ $bstrFileName
        )
{
        /* method LoadFromFile */
}
/* DISPID=35 */
/* VT_BOOL [11] */
function SaveToFile(
        /* VT_BSTR [8]  */ $bstrFileName
        )
{
        /* method SaveToFile */
}
..

SaveToFile() allows arbitrary file creation and overwrite.

The resulting file has the following header:

D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1 00 00 00 00 ...

This seems a Microsoft Office file.

As attachment, two pocs, overwriting the boot.ini file. Change for your needs.

Other attacks are possible, including remote code execution
if the attacker is able to control file content.
At the time of report, however, this could not be achieved. I
will post updates on this if demonstrated.

original url: http://retrogod.altervista.org/9sg_quest_ii.htm

pocs: 
http://retrogod.altervista.org/9sg_quest_ii_1.htm

http://retrogod.altervista.org/9sg_quest_ii_2.htm

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ