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Message-Id: <201204110526.q3B5QUhP003403@sf01web3.securityfocus.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2012 05:26:30 GMT
From: sumanj@...il.com
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Android information leak
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Vulnerability Description
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We found that any android application can read all world-readable files in
the "/proc" directory without specifying any permissions in their manifest
files. This can leak sensitive information. For example, if the user is not
using a network proxy, a malicious application without any permission to
access the user's browsing history can find the websites the user visits
by simply periodically reading "/proc/net/tcp".
Even if the user uses a network proxy we found that a malicious application
can identify the websites the user visits by periodically monitoring the
browser process's memory usage through "/proc/<pid>/statm" and comparing the
measurements with pre-computed signatures. We also found that a malicious
application can measure the inter key-stroke timings of user's typing by
simply monitoring scheduling statistics from "/proc/<pid>/status".
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Credits
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Vulnerabilities found and advisory written by Suman Jana and Vitaly Shmatikov.
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Reference
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http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~suman/publications/oakland12/memento.pdf
"Memento: Learning Secrets from Process Footprints"
by Suman Jana and Vitaly Shmatikov
To appear in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2012
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